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LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this action are Respondent Commercial Security 
Bankf a Utah corporation referred to herein as "the Bankf" and 
Appellant Merrill Bean Chevrolet, a Delaware Corporation, referred 
to herein as "Merrill Bean." No other parties have been included in 
this action at any time. 
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STATEMENT Of ISSUES 
The Bank contends t h a t t h e i s s u e s p re sen t ed by t h i s appeal 
a r e as f o l l o w s : 
1 . Whether t he Bank had an a b s o l u t e c o n t r a c t u r a l r i g h t t o 
d i s c o n t i n u e purchase of M e r r i l l Bean ' s automobi le dea l e r c o n t r a c t s 
of s a l e ( "dea le r paper") under t h e terms of t he agreements between 
t h e p a r t i e s ; 
2 . Whether t h e i n c e n t i v e c l ause i n t h e Loan Committment 
L e t t e r of J u l y 1 9 , 1967 was a c o n d i t i o n for making of the loan t o 
M e r r i l l Bean and whether sa id c l ause i s v i o l a t i v e of the Sherman 
An t i -T rus t Act and t h e Bank Holding Company Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1972; 
3 . Whether t h e Bankf by d i s c o n t i n u i n g purchase of M e r r i l l 
Bean ' s dea l e r paper , made i t imposs ib le for M e r r i l l Bean t o perform 
in such a manner as t o r e a l i z e t h e 1/2% lower mortgage r a t e under 
t he terms of t he Loan Committment L e t t e r , excusing M e r r i l l Bean from 
i t s o b l i g a t i o n a t a 7% r a t e ; and f 
4 . Whether M e r r i l l Bean ' s defenses t o t h e Bank 's c la ims a r e 
ba r red i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y by the d o c t r i n e of i n t e g r a t i o n and t h e 
a p p l i c a b l e S t a t u t e of Frauds . 
STATUTESr fiULES AND ORDINANCES 
RELIED UPQN 
Respondent argues and relies upon the following statutes, 
rules and ordinances in the casef each being contained in full text 
in Appendix A-9 hereto: 
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 25-5-1; 
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 25-5-4; 
12 U.S.C. Section 1972. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Commercial Security Bank, filed a Complaint for 
Declaratory Relief in the District Court of Weber County dated the 
11th day of March, 1986, asking the Court to interpret the meaning 
and effect of a Trust Deed Notef a Trust Deedf and a Letter 
Agreement dated July 19, 1967. Respondent Bank sent Interrogatories 
and then took the deposition of J. Merrill Beanr who is appellant 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet's Chief Executive Officer and by stipulation 
his deposition was published and made a part of the record. The 
Bank then filed its Motion for Summary Judgment which was heard by 
the Honorable David E. Rothf District Judge, on the 22nd day of 
August, 1986. 
After a Motion for Clarification, the Court entered the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of the 
the Bank as prayed in its Complaint dated the 10th day of December, 
1986, and Notice of Appeal was filed January 8, 19 87. The Docketing 
Statement was filed the 28th day of January, 1987, and thereafter 
the Bank filed a Motion for Summary Affirmance and Merrill Bean 
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and both Motions were denied 
on the 25th day of Februaryf 1987. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Respondent Commercial Security Bank adopts as the statement 
of facts the Findings of Fact rendered by the District Court herein, 
as follows: 
1. Commercial Security Bank loaned the sum of $400,000.00 to 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet on or about July 19, 1967 under the terms of 
a loan commitment letter of that date (Finding of Fact No. 1; Record 
on Appeal at 164-165). 
2. Said loan commitment letter of July 19, 1967 provided for 
said loan of $400,000.00 at a 7% rate of interest with a 20 year 
amortization repayment program. One of the terms of that agreement 
provided specifically as follows: 
"The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 
6.5 percent in consideration of the maintenance by you of 
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the 
offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used 
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy 
of said Bank * * *. " 
(Finding of Fact No. 2; Record on Appeal at 165) . 
3. Subsequent to 1967, the plaintiff discontinued purchase 
of automobile dealer contracts including those of Merrill Bean 
Chevrolet. Merrill Bean Chevrolet later withdrew its checking 
account from the Bank and the Bank seeks to enforce the 7% rather 
than 6.5 % interest rate on the loan (Finding of Fact No. 3; Record 
on Appeal at 165). 
4. The addi t ional amount of payments remaining a t the 
maturity of the obl igat ion a t the 7% i n t e r e s t r a t e t o t a l in excess 
of $24,000.00 and as prayed in the Bank's complaint (Finding of Fact 
No, 4; Record on Appeal at 165). 
5 . There i s no evidence tha t the 7% in t e r e s t r a te i s an 
unreasonable r a t e considering the time a t which t h i s loan was made 
and the circumstances under which the t r ansac t ion was consummated 
(Finding of Fact No. 5; Record on Appeal at 165). 
6. Merri l l Bean Chevrolet claims t h a t the Bank's f a i l u r e to 
accept i t s dealer paper caused Merr i l l Bean Chevrolet to shop 
elsewhere for banking serv ices and t h a t other banks would not 
finance i t s dealer paper unless i t t ransfe r red i t s checking account 
to t h a t bank. Thusf Merri l l Bean Chevrolet argues t h a t i t was 
forced to t r ans fe r i t s checking account and the Bank then increased 
the i n t e r e s t r a t e to 7% on the loan. Merri l l Bean Chevrolet further 
argues t h a t the Bank's refusal to accept i t s dealer paper made i t 
impossible for i t to perform the terms of the contract (Finding of 
Fact No. 6; Record on Appeal a t 16 5-16 6 ) . 
7 . In addi t ion , Merri l l Bean Chevrolet argues t h a t the 
Bank's refusal to accept i t s dealer paper made i t impossible for i t 
to perform under the terms of the contract and in addi t ion to the 
imposs ib i l i ty of performance argument also argues t h a t the Bank i s 
equitably estopped from enforcing the higher 7% ra te against i t . 
Merri l l Bean Chevrolet a lso argues t h a t the contract cons t i t u t e s an 
unlawful "tying agreement" in v io l a t i on on the Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1970 (Finding of Fact No. 7; Record on Appeal at 166). 
8, This obl iga t ion i s secured by a note and deed of t r u s t 
upon Merri l l Bean Chevrole t ' s dealership property which, by i t s 
terms f affords the Bank a power of sa le upon default (Finding of 
Fact No. 8; Record on Appeal a t 166) • 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Merril l Bean argues t h a t the Bank breached an agreement 
between the p a r t i e s es tabl i shed by course of dealing and acted in 
bad f a i t h by u n i l a t e r a l l y changing i t s lending policy to discontinue 
purchase of Merri l l Bean's automobile dealer con t rac t s , forcing 
Merri l l Bean to go to another lender which also required placement 
of i t s checking accounts with tha t lender in order to s e l l i t s 
dealer paper; and t ha t such event t r iggered appl ica t ion of the 7% 
mortgage i n t e r e s t r a t e ra ther than the 6 1/2% ra t e . Merri l l Bean 
claims the Bank i s thus estopped from applying the 7% ra te to the 
mortgage loan. However, exp l i c i t wr i t ten cont rac ts between the 
pa r t i e s and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Agreement of January 1, 1966, duly 
authent icated in the record, governed the terms of dealer paper 
purchases and spec i f i ca l ly provided t ha t the Bank was not obligated 
to purchase any quanti ty of dealer paper and t ha t Merril l Bean was 
not obligated to offer any quanti ty of dealer paper. The Loan 
Committment Let ter of July 19, 1967 allowed the Bank to accept only 
those dealer contracts which met i t s lending pol icy; the Bank's 
determination to discontinue purchase of dealer paper was, by 
def in i t ion , a change in lending policy made in good f a i th in 
response to business and economic conditions beyond the Bank's 
cont ro l . The D i s t r i c t Court properly ruled t h a t the Bank had acted 
in accordance with the p a r t i e s ' express agreements. 
The business arrangement se t for th in the Loan Committment 
Let ter of July 19, 1967 i s not v i o l a t i v e of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 or of public pol icy . 
Merri l l Bean argues t h a t the checking account maintenance and the 
automobile dealer contract provisions thereof cons t i t u t e an unlawful 
tying agreement whereby the Bank required Merr i l l Bean to use other 
banking services in order to obtain i t s mortgage loan. The mortgage 
loan was granted a t a f l a t 7% r a t e , 20-year term with no mention of 
other business , 7% being a standard and favorable r a t e for t h i s type 
of loan a t the time i t was made. The other business provisions came 
in to play only as an incent ive for Merri l l Bean to r e a l i z e a 1/2% 
decrease from an already favorable loan r a t e of 7%. Further, the 
provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act argued by Merri l l Bean 
were not enacted by Congress un t i l three (3) years following the 
execution of t h i s t r ansac t ion . However, assuming, arguendo, tha t 
the Act has app l ica t ion to t h i s case, the provisions of the Act 
i t s e l f spec i f i ca l ly exempt such " t r ad i t i ona l banking p rac t i ce s " as 
those found in t h i s case from i t s p roh ib i t ions , and the case law 
in t e rp re t ing the Act, as well as i t s l e g i s l a t i v e h i s to ry , deems 
arrangements of t h i s nature to be both lawful and wise banking 
p r a c t i c e s . F ina l ly , the Merri l l Bean's own of f ice r , James Merri l l 
Bean, t e s t i f i e d in h i s deposi t ion t h a t he had no evidence of any 
unlawful combination or monopolistic agreement. 
Merri l l Bean also argues t h a t the Bank's withdrawal from the 
dealer paper market rendered i t impossible for i t to perform in such 
a manner as to be able to r e a l i z e the 6 1/2% lower ra te and argues 
t h a t i t should be excused from the 7% obl iga t ion under the defense 
of impossibi l i ty of performance. The doctr ine has no appl ica t ion 
where the act ions al legedly hindering performance are act ions 
permitted by the cont rac t . Utah cases further require a showing of 
some degree of wi l l fu lness . The Bank had an absolute r ight to 
withdraw from the purchase of dealer paper and Merri l l Bean made no 
a l l ega t ions of wi l l fu l conduct by the Bank aimed spec i f i ca l ly at 
avoiding performance of an agreement with Merri l l Bean. 
F ina l ly , the record es tabl i shed t h a t Merri l l Bean's defenses 
are based upon pre-contract oral negot ia t ions which are f by nature 
of t h i s t ransac t ion / barred, as the agreements are ful ly in tegrated 
and the subject matter , an i n t e r e s t in real e s t a t e f i s subject to 
the S ta tu te of Frauds. The D i s t r i c t Court thus properly concluded 
t h a t Merri l l Bean, if afforded a t r i a l , could not offer admissible 
evidence supportive of i t s defenses. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE BANK HAD AN ABSOLUTE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM 
THE PURCHASE OF MERRILL BEAN'S DEALER PAPER WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE. 
Merri l l Bean Chevrolet argues under Point I of i t s Brief tha t 
i t was in fact the Bank's breach, contrary to the p a r t i e s ' course of 
deal ing, in refusing to purchase any more dealer paper from Merril l 
Bean Chevrolet, tha t caused Merr i l l Bean Chevrolet ' s withdrawal of 
i t s checking account from the Bank and which occasioned the re turn 
of the i n t e r e s t r a t e on the loan from 6 1/2 percent to 7 percent . 
In order for Merri l l Bean Chevrolet to successfully claim a 
breach by the Bank, i t has to show the existence of some standard, 
contract , or agreement, which es tab l i shes a duty or agreement 
running between the parties in order to claim a breach of that duty 
or agreement. 
The District Court properly found that the promissory note, 
trust deed and loan committment letter were integrated agreements 
containing the elements of the transaction (copies of these 
operative documents are contained in the Appendix to this Brief)• 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet mentions in its Brief the contents of a 
contract between the parties dated January 1, 1966 which further 
supports the Bank's position. 
The purchase of dealer paper generally was subject to that 
contract between the parties dated January lf 1966. At page 17 of 
his deposition (which was published by the District Court) James 
Merrill Bean authenticated the contract of January 1, 1966, the same 
being marked to the deposition as Exhibit 2. An copy of said 
contract is appended hereto as Appendix "A-2" for the Court's 
reference. 
The course of dealing between these parties concerning the 
purchase of dealer paper was first commenced by a "Recourse Dealer 
Purchase Contract" executed September 3, 1965 (Deposition of James 
Merrill Bean at page 12; Exhibit 1 to deposition). Shortly 
thereafter Merrill Bean renegotiated the dealer paper purchase 
contract and was granted the privilege of selling dealer paper to 
the Bank on a non-recourse basis under the terms of the contract of 
January 1, 1966 (Deposition of James Merrill Bean at pages 16 to 17; 
Exhibit 2 to deposition). In response to a question commencing at 
page 17, line 21 of his deposition James Merrill Bean was unable to 
say whether there had been any subsequent contracts under which the 
Bank purchased his dealer paper. Given that deposition testimony 
and the demand in the Notice of Deposition (Record on Appeal at 24) 
that Mr. Bean bring with him all documents concerning this subject, 
the Bank asserts that it was established as a matter of record 
discovery that dealer paper purchases at the times in issue in this 
action were regulated by the contract of January 1, 1966, which was 
authenticated by the testimony of James Merrill Bean. 
Under the explicit terms of the Auto Dealer Agreement of 
January 1, 1966, it is agreed that "nothing herein shall obligate 
the Bank to discount or purchase any contract from the dealer . . . 
" and likewise Merrill Bean was under no compulsion to offer any 
such contracts to the Bank as the Argument further provides that it 
does not "obligate the dealer to offer any contract for sale to the 
Bank" (emphasis added). In regard to this Agreement, it is of 
interest to note that Merrill Bean strongly infers in its Brief that 
the Bank had an obligation to buy its dealer paper. Merrill Bean 
relies heavily on that assertion in advancing its theories of 
estoppel and waiver and its impossibility of performance arguments 
later in its Brief, yet it is quite clear that the express agreement 
between the parties of the January 1, 1966 Agreement was precisely 
the opposite. Merrill Bean fails to cite to any contract or 
agreement which specifically and unequivocably obligated the Bank to 
buy its dealer paper and relies instead on vague assertions of a 
brief course of dealing. Conversely, the Bank is able to cite to 
the Agreement dated January 1, 1966 wherein the parties were not 
obligated to offer or purchase any of the paper; that Agreement 
merely regulated the terms of the purchases if such were offered and 
purchased. Therefore f the D i s t r i c t Cour t ' s conclusion t h a t the Bank 
did not breach the cont rac ts between the p a r t i e s was based upon duly 
authent icated, c lear f and uncontroverted wr i t t en agreements. 
As demonstrated by the uncontroverted Affidavit of Jeff K. Thredgold 
(Record on Appeal at 27) , the Bank's s taff economist, f i l ed with the 
D i s t r i c t Court, with or without the maintenance of the checking 
account and other business with the Bank, Merri l l Bean Chevrolet 
received a very favorable loan a t 7 percent . I t should be noted 
tha t t h i s was a long term loan t h a t s t re tched over 15 years , at a 
f l a t 7 percent r a t e , during the term of which the nat ional prime 
ra te climbed as high as 21+ percent . Merri l l Bean Chevrolet 
remained very well protected from radical increases in i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s due to t h i s favorable financing arrangement which was a t a set 
r a t e and which was very standard a t the time i t was made. Affidavit 
of Jeff K. Thredgold in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Record on Appeal a t 27) . Merri l l Bean's claim tha t i t i s 
prejudiced by the claim of the Bank i s therefore d i f f i c u l t to accept 
as the fixed r a t e mortgage served to shield Merr i l l Bean Chevrolet 
from several radical increases in i n t e r e s t r a t e during the term of 
the mortgage loan which i s the subject of t h i s case. The economic 
fact of the matter i s t h a t the obtainment of t h i s fixed ra te loan 
over a long period of time to finance a commercial s t ruc tu re was an 
inc red ib le stroke of good luck and providence in favor of Merri l l 
Bean Chevrolet. Contrary to Merri l l Bean's argument a t Page 9 of 
i t s Brief, the Bank ac tua l ly earned well under the prevai l ing r a t e 
during much of the term of t h i s loan, even a t 7%, and did not, by 
any i n t e rp re t a t i on , act to procure unconscionable advantage over 
Merrill Bean. Thereforef the actions of the Bank in respect to this 
transaction saved Merrill Bean a great deal of money and the 
District Court appropriately found that the Bank had fully performed 
its obligations and did so in good faith. 
Under Point I of its Brief, Merrill Bean asks the Court to 
accept the proposition that other financial institutions in the 
Ogden area made the same demands upon Merrill Bean as did the Bank; 
i.e., that other financial institutions would not buy Merrill Bean's 
dealer paper unless its checking account was also at that financing 
institution. This argument is not relevant to any of the issues 
raised in this action as Merrill Bean did not allege that the 
requirements of other financial institutions were imposed because of 
an unlawful monopolistic agreement between the Bank and other 
financing institutions in the Ogden area or that the Bank had any 
control whatsoever over the lending policies of its competitors. 
The District Court appropriately ignored these unfounded assertions 
and rendered a clearly proper ruling based upon law and evidence 
before it. 
POINT TWO 
THE MAINTENANCE OF ITS COMMERCIAL CHECKING ACCOUNT AT THE 
BANK AND THE OFFERING OF DEALER CONTRACTS WAS NOT ADDITIONAL 
CONSIDERATION FOR THE MAKING OF THE REAL ESTATE LOAN TO THE MERRILL 
BEAN CHEVROLET; FURTHER, SUCH ARRANGEMENTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE BANK 
HOLDING COMPANY ACT OR THE SHERMAN ANTI TRUST ACT. 
One of the most fundamental misunderstandings of Merrill Bean 
which was fatal to its position at the District Court is the 
assertion which was argued at page 6 of its Memorandum in the 
District Court (Record on Appeal at 90) and in its Brief before this 
Court that "the Bank insisted that the dealer paper and the checking 
account go together as additional consideration for the making of 
the real estate loan." Furtherr Merrill Bean argued to the District 
Court and argues to this Court that to get the real estate loan, it 
had to agree to a "tying arrangement" that was unlawful under the 
Sherman Anti Trust Actf and against public policy as illustrated by 
future passage of the Bank Holding Act of 1970. (Point VIf 
Appellant1s Brief). The elements of the transaction presented to 
the District Court showed that both positions are in error. The 
District Court properly concluded that the Bank gave to Merrill Bean 
a favorable fixed ratef 7 percent, 20 year mortgage loan without any 
requirement for other business whatsoever. The only occasion that 
such other business came into play was as an incentive for Merrill 
Bean to realize a 1/2 percent lower rate. Therefore, the granting 
of the loan was not conditioned on any other factor; maintenance of 
the checking account and the offering of contracts was only an 
incentive for Merrill Bean to realize an even more favorable 6 1/2 
percent rate under the already favorable 7 percent rate. 
Merrill Bean argues the 1970 revision to the Bank Holding 
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 1972 (Point IV, page 16, Appellant's 
Brief) also places great emphasis on the case of Costner vs. Blount 
National Bank, 578 F. 2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1978) as it did at the 
District Court. 
The provisions of 12 U.S.C. Section 1972 are not applicable 
to the instant case as the contract which Merrill Bean claims 
offends the provisions of the Act was made and executed three years 
prior to the enactment of the law. In an attempt to cure that 
problem in the application of the lawf Merrill Bean argues that that 
Court should apply a retroactive public policy determination in 
finding the Bank's loan committment contract to be offensive to the 
anti-tie-down provisions of the Actf or that the Act should be 
applied to the term of the agreements beyond 1970 (Point VI, 
Appellant's Brief). This argument would have this Court stretch 
principals of application of law and determination of public policy 
to ridiculous extremes. However, assuming, arguendo, that the 
provisions of 12 U.S.C. Section 1972 are applicable to this 
situation, the terms of the committment letter are, nonetheless, not 
in violation of the Act as the cases interpreting the same indicate. 
Merrill Bean overlooks the language of the statute itself 
which provides specific exceptions for the type of arrangements 
found in this case. What the statute provides is that "a Bank shall 
not in any manner extend credit . . . on the condition or 
requirement . . . (C) that the customer provide some additional 
credit, property, or service to such bank, other than those related 
to and usually provided in connection with a loan, discount, 
deposit, or trust service" (emphasis added). 
Initially, the record is clear that the Bank did not, by any 
interpretation, condition the extention of credit on any other 
business; a 7% mortgage loan was made without any mention of demand 
deposit accounts or automobile dealer paper. Further, the 
l e g i s l a t i v e h i s tory of the 1970 amendment to the Bank Holding 
Company Act leaves no doubt t ha t Congress spec i f i ca l ly intended to 
exclude from the ant i - t ie-down provisions the type of arrangements 
present in the ins tan t case. The record of the Leg i s l a t ive h is tory 
informs us as fol lows: 
The Senate Anti-Tie-in provision was amended on the floor 
of the Senate"to exclude from its coverage certain specific 
so called traditional banking servicesf i.e. loans, 
discountsf depositsf and trust services. Conference Report 
No. 1747. 91st Congress, Second Session (1970f page 29). 
In the same legislative sessionf Congress further provided a 
specific description of the purpose of the 1970 amendment: 
The purpose of this provision (12 U.S.C. Section 1972) is 
to prohibit anti competitive practices which require bank 
customers to accept or provide some other service or product 
or refrain from dealing with other parties in order to obtain 
the bank product or services they desire. The provision 
authorizes the Federal Reserve Boardf by regulation or order, 
to permit such exceptions to the prohibitions of the section 
as the Board considers will not be contrary to its purposes 
and the Committee expects that by such regulation or order 
that Board will continue to allow appropriate traditional 
banking practices, (emphasis added). 
The statute was not designed to interfere with traditional 
banking practices or attempts by banks to protect their investment. 
Nesglow, Inc. vs. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 506 F. Supp. 254 
(1980). The purpose of Section 1972 is to prevent banks from 
conditioning the granting of credit on unrelated compensating 
business such as requiring the prospective borrower to buy a parcel 
of foreclosed owned real estate along with the loan. The Section is 
not designed to exclude practices which directly protect the bank's 
investment in the particular loan. 
Federal Courts presented with the precise s i t ua t ion found in 
the ins tan t case have uniformly held t ha t these types of 
arrangements do not v i o l a t e the provisions of the Sherman Anti Trust 
Act or the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970. In a case d i r ec t ly on 
point f S ter l ing Coal Company Inc. vs . United American Bank of 
Knoxville, 470 P. Supp. 964 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (a copy being included 
as Appendix "A-7 , ,) f the Court held t h a t no v io l a t i on of the Bank 
Holding Company Act amendments of 1970 occurred by the bank's 
conditioning the grant or extention of c red i t to a closely held 
corporation upon the requirement t ha t the bank supervise and control 
the corpora t ion ' s checking account and other corporate a f f a i r s f 
including veto power over purchases and payment of dividends and 
t h a t the corporation guarantee the personal indebtedness of two of 
i t s sole stock holders . The bank in S te r l ing Coal exercised 
subs tan t i a l ly more control over the a f f a i r s of the S te r l ing Coal 
Company than did Commercial Security Bank over Merri l l Bean 
Chevrolet in the ins tan t case. In t h i s matter , a l l Commercial 
Security Bank did was to grant Merri l l Bean Chevrolet an incent ive 
to maintain i t s corporate checking account a t the Bank in order to 
r e a l i z e a more favorable 6 1/2 percent ra te under an already 
favorable 7 percent loan. Unlike the s i tua t ion found in S te r l ing 
Coal, the Bank exercised no control whatsoever over expenditures 
from the Merril l Bean Chevrolet account or the d ispos i t ion of debts 
of i t s stockholders f although the Court in S te r l ing Coal held t h a t 
circumstances of much greater bank control of the borrower's a f f a i r s 
did not offend the provisions of 12 U.S.C. Section 1972. 
In another case f summary judgment was granted to the banking 
i n s t i t u t i o n where the p l a i n t i f f borrower al leged t h a t requir ing them 
to e s t ab l i sh an i n t e r e s t free escrow tax account cons t i tu ted an 
i l l e g a l t i e - i n arrangement under 12 U. S.C. Section 1972. Bass vs . 
Boston Five Cent Savings Bank, D i s t r i c t Court or Massachusetts, 
September 28 f 1979, CCH Decisions, Paragraph 98.261 (1979-1980 
Ed i t ion) . 
The case r e l i ed upon by Merri l l Bean Chevrolet a t page 16 of 
i t s Brief, Costner v s . Blount National Bank of Marysvil le , 
Tennessee, 578 F. 2d. 1192 (6th Cir . 1979) , i s inappl icable to the 
ins tan t case in several respec ts . F i r s t , the Costner case i s a 
damages case only and does not make any findings or conclusions as 
to a n t i - t i e - i n provisions since the defendant bank conceded a 
v io l a t i on of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 prior to arguing 
i t s appeal . 578 F. 2d a t 1192. 
In order to lend creedance to i t s argument t ha t the Bank's 
p rac t i ces cons t i tu ted an unlawful tying arrangement, Merri l l Bean 
argues under Point I of i t s Brief tha t a l l other banks in the Ogden 
area required the same condit ions and compensating business for the 
purchase of automobile dealer paper and therefore Merri l l Bean was 
l e f t without a choice but to move i t s checking account when the Bank 
would no longer buy i t s paper. Merri l l Bean further argues under 
Point I of i t s Brief tha t since t h i s appeal i s taken from a summary 
judgment t h a t t h i s Court, in construing the f ac t s in the l i g h t most 
favorable to i t , must assume tha t a s se r t ion to be t r u e . However, 
James Merri l l Bean himself, in h i s deposi t ion, t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had 
no evidence whatsoever tha t the Bank pa r t i c ipa t ed in an unlawful 
arrangement in respect to these conditions* Beginning at page 54 of 
his deposition, James Merrill Bean the examination proceeded as 
follows: 
Q: Let me ask you the further question; do you acknowledge 
that on or prior to July 19f 1967, the date of that 
agreement, that Commercial Security Bank actually conspired 
or had an agreement with other banks in the area to impose 
these types of conditions? Do you have any facts that would 
lead you to that conclusion? 
A: No. 
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e a n t i - t r u s t i s s u e s was 
e n t i r e l y a p p r o p r i a t e . Although t h i s Court must cons true t h e f a c t s 
i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e A p p e l l a n t , i t need not accep t 
f a c t s c o n t r o v e r t e d by the Respondent ' s own w i t n e s s . The law under 
which M e r r i l l Bean makes i t s most v o c a l c l a i m , 12 U.S .C. Sec . 1 9 7 2 , 
was not i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t ime t h e t r a n s a c t i o n was consummated; 
f u r t h e r , even when both t h e Bank and t h e t r i a l Court indu lged 
M e r r i l l Bean, arguendo , i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of S e c t i o n 1 9 7 2 , t h e 
s t a t u t e and c a s e s i n t e r p r e t i n g i t f a i l e d t o s u s t a i n i t s p o s i t i o n . 
POINT THREE 
THE BANK DID NOT RENDER MERRILL BEAN CHEVRLOET'S PERFORMANCE 
UNDER THE CONTRACT IMPOSSIBLE AND ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL 
CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
An a d d i t i o n a l theory of de fense advanced by M e r r i l l Bean was 
t h a t t h e Bank's withdrawal from t h e d e a l e r paper market rendered t h e 
a b i l i t y of M e r r i l l Bean t o perform i n such a manner as t o r e a l i z e 
t h e 6 1 /2 lower r a t e i m p o s s i b l e and, t h e r e f o r e , such should excuse 
M e r r i l l Bean from t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o pay a t t h e 7 p e r c e n t r a t e . 
The fundamental inaccuracy stated throughout Merrill Bean's 
Brief and at the District Court, both generally and as to the 
impossibility argumentf is the characterization of the movement of 
the rate from 6 1/2 percent to 7 percent as an increase in the 
interest rate. This is inaccurate because the loan was a 7 percent 
loan from its inception, as stated in the Trust Deedf the Trust Deed 
Notef and the July 19, 1967 Committment Letter, and simply provided 
a method by which Merrill Bean could realize a lower rate by 
maintaining certain other business with the Bank. Therefore, the 
loan was not "increased" but was rather returned to its original 
face rate when Merrill Bean withdrew its other banking business. 
This distinction in terms is important as Merrill Bean construes the 
rate change in the nature of a penalty rather than a return to the 
original loan rate. 
As argued hereinabove and specifically in reference to the 
auto dealer agreement between the parties dated January 1, 1966f 
(Deposition of James Merrill Beanf Exhibit 2), the Bank had the 
contractural right to refuse to purchase dealer paper from Merrill 
Bean with or without cause? also, Merrill Bean was under no 
obligation to offer any specific amount of dealer paper to the Bank. 
Merrill Bean mistakenly argues in its Brief that the Bank had 
committed itself to the purchase of Merrill Bean Chevrolet dealer 
paper by contract and by subsequent course of dealing. However, 
this position is clearly erroneous as Merrill Bean is unable to cite 
to this Court any contract or agreement to that effect beyond 
assertions of course of dealing simply because no such agreement 
ever existed. Conversely, the existence of the written dealer 
agreement dated January lf 1966 defeats Merrill Bean's impossibility 
of performance and course of dealing defenses. In Morton Buildings, 
Inc., vs. Department of Human Resources, 695 P. 2d 450 (Kan. 1985), 
the Court stated: 
. . . it is generally acknowledged that non-performance of a 
condition may not be excused when the actions taken by the 
party allegedly hindering the performance are actions 
permitted by the contract. 695 P. 2d at 452. (emphasis 
added). 
Merrill Bean argues that withdrawal from the purchase of 
dealer paper was a breach on the part of the Bank; howeverf the 
withdrawal of the same was a sound business decision by the Bank 
and, in any event, constituted M . . . actions permitted by the 
contract . . .M Id. 
It is also interesting to note that, again, in spite of the 
plethora of affirmative defenses raised by the Answer, Merrill Bean 
admitted in its Answer sufficient allegations of the Complaint to 
lead to the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Bank performed 
and acted in accordance with the terms of the agreements between the 
parties. This fact can be seen from examining the allegations of 
paragraphs 6 and 7, inclusive, of the Complaint, (Record on Appeal 
at 2) all of which were unconditionally admitted by Merrill Bean in 
its Answer (Record on Appeal at 13-19). 
To illustrate the facts which were established as of record 
due to the admissions of the Answer, it is important to go back to 
the operative language of the loan commitment letter which is in 
issue in this action, the authenticity of which has been admitted in 
the Answer by virtue of the admission of the allegations of 
paragraph 3 of the Complaint* Again, that provision states: 
The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 
6.5% in consideration of the maintenance by you of your 
commercial checking account with the Bank and the offering by 
you to its Bankloan Department of new and used automobile and 
truck contract which meet the lending policy of said Bank. 
(emphasis added) (See Appendix A-2 hereof). 
Merrill Bean ignores the fact that the reduced 6.5% interest 
rate was available only if the purchase of automobile and truck 
contracts met the lending policy of the Bank. Because the Bank 
elected to discontinue the business of purchasing dealer contracts 
from Merrill Beanf those dealer contracts thereafter failed to "meet 
the lending policy of said Bank as a matter of common definition." 
Such a decision by a lender is inherently a change in "lending 
policy." In Answer to paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Merrill Bean 
admitted that in January of 1970 it withdrew all accounts and other 
banking business from the Bank. As the loan commitment letter 
clearly indicates, that is an event which would trigger the 
application of the 7% rate rather than the reduced 6.5% rate. 
By admitting the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Complaint, 
Merrill Bean admitted that the Bank acted within the rights it had 
under the loan commitment contract. Paragraph 7 of the Complaint 
(Record on Appeal at 2) provides as follows: 
7. Effective on or about January of 1970 and in pursuance of 
the terms of the July 29, 1967. commitment letter, as above 
alleged and pursuant to the defendants withdrawal of all of 
its accounts and the banking business from the plaintiff 
Bank, the plaintiff increased the interest rate payable on 
said loan balance to the rate of 7% from the then existing 
6.5% rate." (emphasis added). 
Merrill Bean thereby admits that the change in the interest 
rate was "in pursuance of the terms of the July 19, 1967, commitment 
letter." 
As argued abovef the Bank did not act in such a manner as to 
make performance under the contract impossible for Merrill Bean. The 
Kansas Court in Morton Buildings, Inc., supra, clearly defined the 
quantum of proof required to successfully assert the prevention 
defense: 
. . . the burden is on the party seeking to take advantage of 
the doctrine to prove its application. In addition, the 
conduct to have thwarted performance of the condition must in 
some way be unjustified . . . the party who has demanded the 
condition precedent cannot hinder, delay, or prevent it 
happening for the purpose of avoiding performance of the 
contract. 
Similarly, it is generally acknowledged that non-performance 
of a condition may not be excused when the actions taken by 
the party allegedly hindering the performance are gctjong 
permitted by the contract. 695 P. 2d at 452 (emphasis added). 
Merrill Bean failed to present to the District Court facts 
which would raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Bank 
withdrew from the purchase of automobile dealer contracts "for the 
purpose of avoiding performance of the contract (which in this case 
is the loan commitment letter)." In fact, by its admission of 
certain allegations of the Complaint as detailed above, Merrill Bean 
conceded as a matter of fact that the Bank withdrew from the dealer 
paper financing business by virtue of general economic factors 
existing in the automobile business at that time. This results in 
the establishment of a fact which is exactly opposite to a necessary 
element of the impossibility defense; that is, that the Bank 
withdrew from the dealer paper business for the specific purpose of 
avoiding performance of the contract with Merrill Bean Chevrolet, 
A Utah case on point shows that Merrill Bean could not, if 
given a trial, prevail on any claim of prevention of performance. 
This is due to the fact that this Court has required proof of a high 
degree of willfulness and conduct aimed specifically at avoiding or 
preventing performance of a particular contractural relationship. 
In Weber Meadow View Corporation vs. Wilde, 575 P. 2d 1053 (Utah 
1978), this Court explained this high standard based on a factual 
scenario similar to that found in the instant case: 
One who enters into a contract must cooperate in good faith 
to carry out the intention of what the parties had in mind 
when it was made; and that he should not be permitted to 
engage in any subterfuge or devious means to prevent the 
other from performing and then use that as an excuse for 
failing to keep his own commitment. The significant fact 
here is that the plaintiff makes no claim that there is any 
such subterfuge or collusion. In response to the Courts 
question, its counsel expressly stated that it did not claim 
any collusion or bad faithf which it will be notedf is in 
conformity with the omission of any such contention in the 
stipulated facts above recited. 575 P. 2d at 1058 (emphasis 
added). 
In two additional cases, this Court held that the party 
invoking the prevention of performance defense must show that the 
other party to the contract acted in a willful manner to prevent the 
performance of the particular contractural relationship. Reed vs. 
Alvie, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Cahoon vs. Cahoon, 641 P. 2d 140 
(Utah 1982). 
The facts established as a matter of record in this case take 
away from Merrill Bean the ability to prove as a matter of law or 
fact that the Bank acted willfully or through subterfuge or 
collusion to prevent Merrill Bean from performing in such a manner 
as to realize the lower 6.5% interest rate under the terms of the 
loan commitment letter. On the contraryf by admitting that the Bank 
withdrew from purchase of its dealer contracts as a matter of Bank 
policy and due to economic and business conditions in the automobile 
industry, Merrill Bean painted a factual scenario which is the 
precise opposite of any supportable allegation of conspiracy, 
subterfuge, or willful conduct on the part of the Bank. The ruling 
of this Court in Weber Meadowview Corporation combined with the 
established facts of record in this case bars the ability of Merrill 
Bean under any interpretation of those facts to make a case under 
the defense of prevention of performance if afforded a trial, and 
the District Court properly so held. Merrill Bean necessarily 
advances the position that this transaction consisted of a 6.5% loan 
which was later raised to 7%; such is not the case. This particular 
transaction consisted of three written documents, specifically, the 
Deed of Trust, the Trust Deed Note, and the loan commitment letter. 
The Trust Deed Note is stated at a 7% interest rate and the Trust 
Deed itself does not contain a discount clause. Further, the loan 
commitment contract states on the first page that this is a 7% loan 
and merely provides an incentive toward the end of the contract to 
lower the rate to 6.5% rate if other business is maintained. The 
Bank reserved the right to purchase dealer contracts only if the 
same met the "lending policy of said Bank." Certainly, no 
r e s p o n s i b l e f i n a n c i n g i n s t i t u t i o n would gua ran tee t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
a c e r t a i n type of b u s i n e s s over a l eng thy pe r iod of t ime which may 
not always meet i t s l end ing p o l i c i e s which f of cou r se , w i l l change 
from time t o t ime due t o p r e v a i l i n g economic c o n d i t i o n s beyond t h e 
c o n t r o l of t h e Bank. There fore , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t 
t h e Bank ' s conduct did not make performance of t h e c o n t r a c t by 
M e r r i l l Bean imposs ib l e was proper as t h e c o n t r a c t pe rmi t t ed t h e 
Bank, by i t s t e r m s , t o a c t a s i t d i d . 
POINT FQTO 
MERRILL BEAN'S PRINCIPAL DEFENSES ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE 
OF INTEGRATION AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
As the foregoing statement of Facts, the Deposition of James 
Merrill Bean, and the operative documents indicate, the transaction 
in issue in this action was reached between sophisticated commercial 
parties, was a transaction which was completely reduced to signed 
written instruments (prepared and reviewed with advice of counsel) 
and was a transaction concerning real property interests. 
It is the stated position of Merrill Bean that it was 
entitled to a 6 1/2% interest rate on the Note and Deed of Trust 
over the entire life of the loan rather than the 7% rate provided in 
the instruments. (Deposition of J. Merrill Bean at page 47; Answer 
of Defendant). However, the stated evidentiary basis of this 
defense clearly shows that it is barred by the doctrine of 
integration and the statute of frauds. At page 47 of his 
deposition, James Merrill Bean testified as follows: 
"Q: I s n ' t i t f in fact f your posi t ion t ha t t h i s note and t r u s t 
deed should have amortized a t six and a half percent over i t s 
e n t i r e l i f e ? 
A: Yes, 
Q: Upon what do you base tha t conclusion? 
A: The representa t ions tha t were made to me by of f icers of 
the Bank p r io r to my going in to sign the loan agreement," 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, although Merri l l Bean's President admits t h a t the Notef 
Trust Deed and Loan Commitment Let ter a l l s ta ted a 7% in t e re s t r a t e f 
Merril l Bean's key defensive asse r t ion i s based upon al leged oral 
negot ia t ions conducted pr ior to the execution of the loan documents. 
On t h i s bas i s , the Bank was e n t i t l e d to the summary judgment as a 
matter of law as the loan documents are in tegra ted con t rac t s , 
barring Merri l l Bean's advancement of defenses based on parole 
evidence of pre-execution oral negot ia t ions . 
In order to prove i t s case f Merril l Bean attempted and now 
attempts to introduce parole evidence outside of the terms of the 
loan documents. That i s f i t attempts to show tha t the loan 
contracts between i t and the Bank are not ful ly integrated 
agreements in the aspect of the s ta ted ra te of i n t e r e s t . In 
essence, Merril l Bean i s attempting to boots t rap into the agreements 
a di f ferent r a t e of i n t e r e s t than i s expressly s ta ted the re in . The 
D i s t r i c t Court properly found t ha t the loan documents are ful ly 
in tegrated con t rac t s , A general statement of the law with respect to 
t h i s issue i s found a t Eie vs . Saint Benedict 's Hospital , 638 P. 2d 
1190 (Utah 1981) r where t h i s Court held; 
The general rule is that in the absence of fraudf an 
apparently complete and certain agreement which the parties 
have reduced to writing will be conclusively presumed to 
contain the whole agreement; and that parole evidence of 
contemporaneous conversationsf representations or statements 
will not be received for the purpose of varying or adding to 
the terms of the written agreement. The foregoing general 
rule applies only to integrated contracts. Whether the 
parole evidence is admissible therefore, depends on whether 
we are dealing with an integrated writing. 638 P. 2d at 1194. 
The criteria to be applied in determining whether particular 
subject matter was intended to be covered by an agreement has been 
stated by this Court as follows: 
In deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory 
index for the judge is found in the circumstances whether or 
not the particular element of the alleged extrinsic 
negotiations is dealt with at all in the writing. If it is 
mentioned, covered or dealt with in the writing, then 
presumably the writing was meant to represent all of the 
transactions on that element . . . 
Alexander vs. Brown, 646 P. 2d 692, 694 (Utah, 1982) (quoting 
Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical Company. 143 P. 2d 281, 283 (Utah 1943)). 
Evidence varying the terms of contract is admissible only if it is 
necessary to clarify an ambiguity in the terms of a written 
agreement. Rowley vs. Marrcrest Homeowners Association, 6 56 P. 2d 
414, 417 (Utah, 1982) . 
Merrill Bean clearly understood the interest rate being 
charged on the loan as the rate is clearly and unambiguously stated 
in the loan committment letter, the Trust Deed, and the Note, as 
admitted in his deposition testimony: 
"Q: All right. Again, my question would be, that was 
offered as a 7 percent loan, wasn't it? 
A: That paper (Exhibit 5) is written as a 7% loan . . . 
(Deposition at P. 23) (paranthetical comment added). 
Furtherf Mr, Bean knew what the defendant needed to do to 
realize the lower 6 1/2 % incentive rate provided in the July 19, 
1967 Committment Letter: 
MQ: Now in terms of the practical and logistical 
considerations provided in that clause, what was your 
understanding of what you needed to keep with Commercial 
Security in order to keep that lower rate? 
A: The company checking account to be maintained at the 
bank, 
Q: At that time, did you have any objection to maintaining 
your commercial checking account with Commercial Security 
bank? 
A: No. 
(Depos i t ion a t p . 30) • 
Mr, Bean was e n t i r e l y c l e a r on t h e unambiguous meaning of t he 
terms of t h e agreements , ye t admi t s , in record t e s t imony , t o breach 
of t h e terms of t he J u l y 19 , 1967 Committment L e t t e r which would 
al low inu re t h e b e n e f i t of t he lower r a t e : 
MQ: Okay. But i s n ' t i t t r u e t h a t around 1970, though, t h a t 
you did withdraw your compensating ba lance accoun t s , for 
example, your commercial checking account? 
A: I d o n ' t know if t h e da te i s a c c u r a t e , bu t , ye s , I took my 
checking account out of Commercial Secu r i ty Bank." 
(Deposi t ion a t page 4 7 ) . 
Regarding a term of an agreement such as an interest ratef it 
would be patently illogical to find an ambiguity where such a term 
is plainly stated as a readily identifiable digit. The first 
paragraph of the Loan Committment Letter specifies the rate as do 
the Note and Trust Deed; the rate is clearly stated in an 
unmistakable form. And the above-cited deposition testimony clearly 
shows Mr, Bean was well aware of the termsf the meaning thereoff and 
the inclusion of that subject matter into the written instruments. 
Merrill Bean's defenses which are based upon pre-contract 
oral negotiations are also barred by the Statute of Frauds as the 
transaction which is the subject of the instant case consists of the 
taking of " . . . trust or power over or concerning real property . 
. . " UTAH CODE ANN. Section 25-5-1, as amended. Further, the 
transaction was not to be performed within one (1) year and thus the 
oral evidence advanced by defendant contradicting the terms is 
barred. UTAH CODE ANN. Section 25-5-4 (1) , as amended. The purpose 
of the Statue of Frauds is to prevent fraud and perjury regarding 
matters which the law deems would be in writing to be enforceable. 
Bently v. Potter. 694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984). The District Court 
properly afforded the written agreements between the parties full 
force and effect according to their terms and prevented Merrill Bean 
from cluttering the record with assertions which could not be 
supported by admissible evidence at trial. 
The decision of the D i s t r i c t Court awarding judgment as 
prayed was e n t i r e l y proper under the fac t s of t h i s case and the law 
appl icable the re to . The Bank acted in accordance with clear terms 
of ful ly in tegrated agreements which Merril l Bean sought to 
controvert only with inadmissible parole evidence. The Bank's 
requirement t ha t Merri l l Bean merely maintain i t s commercial 
checking account with the Bank to enjoy a one-half percent reduction 
of an already favorable ra te did not v i o l a t e the Bank Holding 
Company Act because the Act was not in effect in 1967; in any eventf 
such arrangements are exempted t r a d i t i o n a l banking re la t ionsh ips 
under the s t a t u t e and cases in t e rp re t ing the same such tha t Merri l l 
Bean's defense thereunder i s without merit even assuming, arguendo> 
tha t the Act appl ies here . Further, James Merri l l Bean admitted 
under oath to having no evidence of any conspiracy or unlawful 
combination involving the Bank. 
The record in the D i s t r i c t Court and the law properly 
appl icable to the fac t s of t h i s case lead to the conclusion tha t the 
D i s t r i c t Court ' s ru l ing i s sound and ful ly supported by the lawf 
fac ts and competent evidence presented. The Bank therefore requests 
t h a t t h i s Court affirm the Judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court. 
DATED t h i s / ~* day of Mayf 1987. 
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AUTO DEALER AGREEMENT 
NON RECOURSE 
THIS AGREEMENT entered into at Ogden, Weber County, 
Utah, this 1st day of January , 19 66 , by and 
between Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. , hereinafter 
called "Dealer", and COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, Ogden, Utah, 
hereinafter called "Bank", .and is intended to govern the 
purchase by Bank from Dealer of motor vehicle installment 
sale security agreements representing the sale by Dealer 
to purchasers of new and used motor vehicles. 
The parties mutually agree as follows: 
1. The Bank will purchase from Dealer from time to 
time, without recourse, security agreements properly assigned 
by Dealer covering the sale of new and used vehicles executed 
on forms acceptable to the Bank, and at current rates of 
discount from time to time established by the Bank. Nothing 
herein shall obligate the Bank to discount or purchase any 
contract from the Dealer nor obligate the Dealer to offer 
any contract for sale to the Bank. 
2. The purchase price to be paid by the Bank for each 
such agreement shall be the total unpaid contract balance 
shown thereon discounted at the rate currently in effect. 
The purchase price shall be paid to the Dealer, or at 
Dealer's option, credited to his account upon proper execution 
of the assignment of the agreement and delivery of the 
document to the Bank, The Bank thereafter shall succeed 
to all the right, title, estate and interest of the Dealer 
under said agreement* The Dealer shall furnish evidence 
of insurance by a company acceptable to Bank protecting 
the Bank and the Dealer as their interests may appear 
covering comprehensive and collision ($100.00 deductible 
minimum). The Bank at its option, may procure such 
insurance and charge the same against the contract balance. 
3. If the total unpaid contract balance shown on the 
agreement at the time of purchase shall exceed the amount 
for which such contract was purchased by the Bank, plus the 
amount of the discount, the excess shall be credited to the 
Dealer18 reserve account with the Bank. This account shall 
also be credited with Dealerfs insurance participations and 
charged with unearned insurance participations resulting from 
cancellation of policies prior to their expiration dates. 
Thereafter on a monthly basis, except as hereafter provided, 
and if Dealer be not in default on any obligation to the 
Bank, howsoever arising, the Bank shall remit to the Dealer 
from the reserve account, the amount by which the credit 
balance insaid account shall, at the date of payment, exceed 
one-half of one percent (.5%) of the aggregate unpaid balance 
of all security agreements purchased from Dealer. This 
reserve account, however, is hereby continually pledged 
and assigned for all of Dealer1 s obligations to the Bank, 
now or hereafter existing, absolute or contingent including 
Dealer's share of any unearned finance charge refunded to 
purchasers of vehicles upon prepayment of agreements purchased 
hereunder and any finance charge unpaid if a motor vehicle 
be repossessed, with the right ih the Bank accordingly to 
apply such reserve or any part thereof. 
4. The Bank shall make all collections under agree-
ments which it shall purchase and shall effect repossessions 
when necessary, all at its expense, provided, however, that 
whenever any of the following shall occur: 
(a) If any agreement purchased by the Bank is in 
violation of any law, public policy, or regulation 
of any city, county, state or federal governmental 
agency or is held to be not legally enforceable 
for any reason whatsoever. 
(b) If any of the covenants, warranties or representa-
tions made by the Dealer in the assignment of a 
security agreement are breached, violated or held 
to be untrue. 
(c) If any loss to the Bank shall occur under any 
agreement as a result of failure of the Dealer 
properly to complete the registration of any 
vehicle showing the interest or lien of the Bank. 
(d) If possession of a motor vehicle, the contract or 
agreement covering which is purchased by the Bank 
hereunder, was obtained by any fraudulent scheme, 
trick or device on the part of the buyer thereof 
then in such event the Dealer, at the option of and upon demand 
by the Bank, will pay to the Bank the unpaid balance due under 
the particular security agreement less any unearned finance 
charges and the Bank will thereupon reassign said agreement 
to the Dealer. 
5. In the event of repossession by the Bank of a 
motor vehicle covered by a security agreement purchased 
by the Bank hereunder under which the amount of the finance 
charge disbursed by the Bank to the Dealer is shown to 
exceed two (2%) percent of the price paid by the Bank in 
purchasing said agreement, the Dealer upon demand agrees 
to repurchase the agreement for the sum of the unpaid balance 
due under said agreement, less any unearned finance charge, 
upon delivery by the Bank of the vehicle to any place of 
business of the Dealer. 
6. All notices, demands or tenders to Dealer referred 
to herein may be made in person, orally, or by mail addressed 
to the Dealer at his last known address as appears upon the 
records of the Bank* 
7. The rights and liabilities of the Bank and the 
Dealer as set forth in this agreement, are in addition to 
those set forth, or which may be set forth in the contracts, 
the assignments thereof, and inrelated documents which the 
Dealer may sell, transfer, assign and deliver to the Bank. 
8. If the Dealer defaults in the performance of this 
agreement, or any other agreement, representation, guaranty, 
or endorsement in favor of the Bank, or defaults in the 
payment to the Bank in accordance with the terms and conditions 
of the Dealer's obligations to the Bank, then the Bank, at 
its election may declare all obligations of the Dealer to 
the Bank immediately due and payable and proceed to exercise 
its legal rights at such time, place and in such manner as 
it may elect and in particular may apply the Dealer's 
reserve account to any direct or contingent obligation of 
the Dealer in favor of the Bank. 
~5T^4)ealer agrees to pay and discharge all costs, and 
expenses that may arise from enforcing this agreement or 
any rights arising or created hereunder in favor of the Bank, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
10. The waiver by Bank of any breach or default of 
the terms, covenants or agreements of this agreement shall 
be limited to the particular instance and shall not operate 
as a waiver of any further breach or default of the terms, 
covenants or agreements contained herein. 
11. If any provision of this agreement shall be 
invalid, the other terms and conditions shall remain in 
full force and effect. 
12. This agreement shall be irrevocable until all 
agreements purchased hereunder by Bank from Dealer shall 
have been paid in full to Bank, and shall inure to the 
benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives, 
successors and assigns of the parties hereto, and any 
company or organization subsidiary to or affiliated with 
Bank to whom Bank may assign this agreement and/or cause 
to purchase agreements from dealer as herein set forth. 
That, except as herein otherwise specifically provided, 
Dealer hereby waives notice of non-payment, repossession 
and all other notices to which Dealer might otherwise be 
entitled by law* 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have caused these 
presents to be executed the day and year first above 
written* 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. 





Current year model (new) 36 
Current year model (used) 36 
Previous Year Model 30 
2 & 3 previous year model 30 
f* & 5 previous year model 24 
6 previous year model and older 18 
100% DDCTL kh% 
95% ( Used Car k\% 
( 
90% ( Guide 4%% 
( 
90% ( Wholesale 5 % 
( 
90% ( Value 5%% 
( 
85% ( 6 % 
Minimum service charge $15 — Minimum payment $25 
If Dealer gives a warranty on automobiles older than previous 
year's model, a copy of such warranty must accompany contract at 
time of purchase and cover automobile if repossessed. 
A P P E N D I X " A - 2 " 
SHINCTON BOULEVARD AT TWENTY-FIFTH STREET 
P. O. BOX 1480 • OGDEN, UTAH 84402 
July 19, 1967 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. 
2626 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 
Attn: Mr. Merrill Bean 
T^iHra^BI 
Gentlemen: 
Commercial Security Bank, hereafter referred to as said bank, hereby 
commits to lend Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. the sum of $400,000.00, 
7% interest, for a term of 15 years with a 20 year amortization repay-
ment program. This commitment is subject to the following terms: 
1. This loan to be secured by a first mortgage on approximately eight 
acres of land located at the northwest corner of Wall Avenue and Harris 
Street, Ogden, Utah and improvements to be constructed according to plans 
as presented to said bank, upon which said bank made its appraisal. 
2. A CLTA Title Insurance Policy issued by &.-.title company acceptable 
to said bank, showing good and marketable title with no lien exceptions 
other than the bank's first mortgage and current years taxes. 
3. The loan of $400,000.00 to be based upon the following ratio: two-
thirds of the cost of the land and two-thirds of the cost of the improve-
ments. All personal property including office furniture and equipment, 
shop equipment, excluding carpets and drapes, will not be considered as 
part of the real estate improvements and will have to be paid in cash by 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. 
4. Broad form fire and extended coverage insurance, at your expense, 
for the amount of the improvements with an insurance company satisfactory 
to said bank having a general rating of A and a financial rating of not 
less than BBB+ as rated by the Best Insurance Guide of 1966. A certificate 
of insurance from such a recognized company will be acceptable, properly 
endorsed with a loss payable clause in favor of the bank to insure its 
interest. 
5. A survey with a plat by a licensed engineer or surveyor of the State 
of Utah, showing that all improvements are located on the property and a 
Certificate from proper authority showing that the same are built in accor* 
dance with the zoning and regulatory authorities. 
6. The contractor and the written contract to be 
Performance and payment bonds complying with the laws 
by the bank's legal counsel shall be ftarnished by the 
by a surety company approved by the bank. 
approved by the bank, 
of Utah and approved 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
^ O 
Me *11 Bean Chevrolet, Inc. July 19, iyt>/ rag* <. 
7. Disbursements from the loan proceeds for the construction of the 
improvements will be disbursed as the work progresses upon written evidence 
from the architect stating that said work is performed in a satisfactory and 
workmanlike manner and written evidence acceptable to said bank that no liens 
or unpaid bills are outstanding at the time of each disbursement. Disbursements 
and construction will be also governed by the bank's standard building and loan 
agreement which you will be required to sign* 
8. The bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 6%% in con-
sideration of the maintenance by you of your commercial checking account with 
the bank and the offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used 
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy of said bank. As 
further consideration for the above, the bank agrees to waive all fees and 
charges in connection with this loan except title insurance, survey, recording 
and usual out of pocket expenses in connection with closing and would further 
extend prepayment privileges as follows: 
After 5 years from date, all or part of the principal of this note may 
be paid in advance without penalty. Within such 5 year period, the 
makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one 
year to another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided 
that the extra payments to principal are no more than 20% of the original 
principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a pre-
payment fee for amounts paid in excess of the 20% as follows: 1% of the 
original loan amount if paid during the first 5years of the loan. 
9. Written acceptance of this commitment is required within ten days after 
date of commitment. Said commitment will expire after sixty days if construc-
tion has not commenced on said improvements. Payments on note to commence six 
months after date construction begins. 
10. It is agreed that paragraph 8 of the bank's standard form trust deed, 
pursuant to your request, will be deleted. 
Sincerely, 
Tordon L. Belnap 
Vice -Pres ident 
GLB/mk 
The terms of this commitment are hereby accepted this % 7 day of_ 
1967. _ 
Merrill Beah ChevroJ^t, Inc. 
/ 
/ 
A P P E N D I X " A - 3 " 
RECORDED. MAIL TO: 
frTMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
U t f W I I -— 
oqden, Utah Y \ > / 
ragged '/yV^^-y*3 "' ^ 
--cr.pcred ]2 , Pegs B"-
1?f7 SEP 25 PM 3 59 
RUTH EAKES OLSEN 
DEPUTY;. ^  ^ I ^ A 4 L 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this . 3rd 
TRUST DEED ^ <,-
With Assignment of RcnU / 0 
__ day of £ u 9 H S t _ 
between 
whose address is 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED, a C o r p o r a t i q n _ 19 
67 
as TRUSTOR. 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a Corporat ion 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a Corporat ion 
, as TRUSTEE, and 
as BENEFICIARY 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER OF SALE, the 
following described property, situated in Weber • County. State of Utah: 
A part of the Northwest g a r t e r of Section 5, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, of the Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, United States Survey: Beginning at a point on the West l ine of 
Wall Avenue 524.9 f e e t North 89° 46' 20n West and North 0° 58' East 392.0 feet from 
the Southeast corner of said Northwest Quarter Sect ion, said point being at Ogden City 
Engineer's "A" Station 27+94.00 and "B" Station 76+40.20; running thence North 89° 46' 20' 
West 691.0 f ee t ; thence North 0° 58* East 5Cl. 5 f e e t ; thence South 89° 46' 20" East 691.( 
f ee t ; thence South 0° 58' West 501.5 fee t to the point of beginning. Containing 8.0 acr< 







Together with mil buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way. easements, rents, i 
profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or ei 
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT. HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given \ 
conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such renu. issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness and all other lawful charges evidenced by 
mlssory note of even date herewith. In the principal sum of f_4Q0_,0QQ<.0.Q . made by Trustor, payi 
the order of Beneficiary at all times. In the manner and »»th interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or rei 
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained: (*> the payment of su 
ditlona! loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a prot 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by thU Trust Deed: and M) the payment of all sums expended or advan 
Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided. 
«* »I'd m&lZ 
fa 
^ o T E C T THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED. TRUSTOR AGREES: 
j. .To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or 
t o r a promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; 
/^comply with all law*:" covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to 
commit, suffer or permU any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use 
of aaid property.may be reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; and. If the loan 
secured hereby or any-pa'rt thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property. 
Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with 
plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect aaid property at all times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor 
under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive alt facts and statements therein, and to act 
thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance against such casualties as Beneficiary may require, in an amount, for such term. 
and in a company or companies satisfactory to Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in a form satisfactory 
to Beneficiary. In<he event of loss or damage. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary. Beneficiary may make 
proof of loss and settle and adjust all claims thereunder, applying the proceeds at its option, to reduction of the amount 
due hereunder, or to the restoration or repair of the property damaged. Payment of such loss may be made directly to 
Beneficiary. In the event of the refusal or neglect of Trustor to provide insurance or to maintain same, or to renew same 
in a manner satisfactory to Beneficiary, then Beneficiary may itself procure and maintain such insurance and charge the 
cost thereof to Trustor under the provisions of paragraph 7 hereof. Beneficiary shall not be required to accept or ap-
prove any policy of insurance or any renewal of an existing policy, which is not delivered to it prior to 30 days before the 
expiration date of existing coverage even though the same may be otherwise satisfactory to beneficiary. 
S. To deliver to. pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence 
of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title Insurance and any extensions or renewals 
thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said property, or 
the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any such 
action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable 
sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments 
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said 
property; to pay, when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at 
any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without 
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, 
may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof. 
Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes; Commence, appear in and defend any 
action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase. 
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior 
hereto: and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may 
deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest 
from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be 
secured hereby--
-to^maJteriany-volnntary-'inter-vivoa-tran3fer-of-the---premisee-or-'any~ part thereof without first obtaining the 
JfW written consent of the BeneficiaryTTfcnjr-sucb-transfer iJL_tbe_JBe_neficiary shall not so consent, shall constitute a default 
/-/_\under the terms of this instrument and the note it secures, and BeneficiaryTnay-cause same lo be foreclosed, and the premises 
i sold.- according to-la w—and-the-provisions- hereof. — _ _ — - — - _ - ^ _ _ _ _ ™ _ _ _ -I-L-Tmiznr -
/ x IT IS MUTV.UXY AGREED THAT: 
. 9. Should said property or any part thereqf be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation 
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, 
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at Its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in 
its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or 
damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of 
fire and other Insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom 
all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute 
such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee 
may require. 
10. At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of 
this Trust Deed and tn* note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and retention), without affect-
ing the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby. Trustee may (a) consent to the making of 
any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon: (c) join in any 
subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey. without warranty. 
all or any part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled 
thereto", and the recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Trustor 
agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
11. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents, 
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon. 
Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement 
hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to default as 
they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease 
and Beneficiary shall naive the right, with or without taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents. 
royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such 
moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to 
collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be. or be construed 
to be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordina-
tion of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
12. Upon default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or 
by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver). 
and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession 
of said property or any part thereof, and in its own name sue or otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including 
those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
IS. The entering npon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the 
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and 
the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or 
Invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
14. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver o( 
such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
15. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the 
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option 
of Beneficiary. In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice o< 
default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notie< 
for record in each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof is situated Beneficiary also shall deposi 
with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
8 
the lapse of «uch time as may then be required by law following the recordation of saJd noMc* of default 
| # + "£{ default and notice of sale having been given as then required by lam-. Trustee, -without demand on Trustor! 
^ . !.•••'\r%»id property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a mhole or in 




r£icb such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to the higbest 
bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the 
sale may. for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and. In e%ery 
such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place last 
appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day be>ond the day designated in the notice 
of sale, notice thereof shall £e given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver 
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The 
recitals in the Deed of any matters or fact sball be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. An> person. Including 
Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs 2nd expenses of 
exercising the power of sale and of sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred by the 
Trustee and the Beneficiary but not to exceed ten (10*",<) per cent of the unpaid indebtedness at the time of such sale'with 
the minimum total of said fees not to be less than $250.00; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with 
such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with 
sccrued interest at 1 0 ^ per annum from date of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the re-
mainder, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance 
of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place 
2 7. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured 
hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses 
incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
18. Beneficiary m a v appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the' County Recordei 
of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the sub-
stitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named 
herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall 
be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
19. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees 
adminstrators. executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several The tern 
"Beneficiary" sball mean the owner and bolder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby In this Trust Deed 
whenever the text to requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number include: 
the plural. 
20. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record a 
provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Trust Deed or o 
any action in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
21. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah, 
22. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder b< 
mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
IK WITNESS, ^"HEREOF THE Tmator baa caused these presents to be executed the day and year first above written 
.-•I'Uft.rc*^ p \ MERRILL* BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED 
!ZP>.\\ *. ^ : 









Oa th« day of —« . I I _ . personally appeared before me 
the signer of the above instrument, who .duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at 
My commission expires: 
CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE of PTAH j 
COUNTY OF WEBER J « -
Os the 3rd
 d a y ? f August % u _ § l . personally appeared before me J . M. B e a n 
**V J e r r y 3 C < l p ^ ^ ; a d . who being by me duly sworn did say thst they are the president a 
S ^ c r e t a o ^ r i f ^ t l t S y ^ o f MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED 
corporstion. and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board 
Directors, and , " " " . „ J * M« B e a n and J e r r y K. W h i t e h e a d
 a n d e a c l i 
them acknowledge to a rfre, that aaid corporstion executed the ssme. ^— 
*•* ^ v * , f ^ : Notary Public ^ /f 
v ."^ / o : - : Residing at Oqd6h , U t a h 
_ r-S/11771 . r . : r ; 
My Cbnrmissi .on E m p i r e ' s : 
A P P E N D I X " A - 4 " 
400.000,00 Ogden, Utah . August 3 - 1 9 67 
For value received, I, we, or either of ns, promise to pay to COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK of Ogden, Utah, or order. 
it its offices in Ogden, Utah, tbe principal snm of 
FCUR HUNDRED THOUSAND and NO/100 Dollars, 
with interest thereon from the date hereof until paid at the rate of 2 % per annum, both principal and interest 
payable only in lawful money of the United States of America. 
It is understood and agreed, however, that monthly installments of 
3 , 1 0 2 , 0 0 THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWO and NO/100
 pr>]lB 
including interest, shall be paid on this note, the first of said Installments to be paid on the ±~Hi day of 
J&nuaxy , i s 6 8 , and one of said installments to be paid on the L j^-fr day of each 
and every month thereafter until the J 5 t h <jaT 0f $$£$$&§* , 19 J*?_, at which time 
the whole of the unpaid principal, together with the accrued Interest, shall be due; each of said monthly installment* to be 
applied first to the payment of accrued interest on the unpaid principal, and the balance thereof to be credited on said principal. 
After 5 years from date, all or part of tbe principal of this note may be paid in advance without penalty. 
Within such 2 year period, the makers reserve the privilege, which shall NOT be cumulative from one year to 
another, to pay without penalty amounts which are greater, provided that the extra payments to principal are no more than 
2Q cp0 0f the original principal balance in any one note year. The makers agree to pay a prepayment fee for 
anaonnts paid In excess of the ~ % aa follows: ± % of the original loan amount if paid during the 
first XJOI years of the loan and—**£5!= % of the original loan amount if paid during tbe next ±2 years. 
And in case default be made in the payment of any of said installments of principal or interest at the times and in the 
manner aforesaid, then such installment or payment. Installments or payments, so in default, shall be added to and become a 
part of tbe principal sum, and from tbe date when each installment should have been paid until it is paid it sball bear tbe 
same rate of interest as tbe principal debt, being a part thereof; and at any time during sucb default in payment or in tbe 
performance of any agreement, covenant or condition in the Trust Deed securing this note, the bolder hereof, at its option, and 
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable. 
In the event any Installment of principal and interest shall remain unpaid for a period of 15 days after due. the under-
signed, at tbe option of tbe bolder hereof and upon demand, agree to pay as a late charge a sum equivalent to two (2%) percent 
of the principal amount of such installment. 
If this note be placed for collection, either with or without suit, the undersigned jointly and severally agree to pay all 
costs and expenses thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, guarantors and endorsers hereby severally waive presentment for payment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest 
and notice of protest and of non-payment of this note, and all defenses on the ground of any extension of the time of payment 
that may be given by the holder to them or any of them; and also agree that further payments of principal or interest in re-
newal thereof shall not release them as makers, guarantors or endorsers. 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET INCORPORATED 
BY* 
— T z t — J . M. Bean, president 
ATTEST * 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE/35F UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, INC., 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION/\ 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT V 
Case No, 95147 
Having heard arguments of counsel and having examined 
the memoranda on file, I rule as follows: 
At the time of the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment I ruled that the Statute of Limitations defense and the 
defense of laches were not persuasive to me and I granted 
plaintifffs motion for summary judgment on those issues. I also 
found that the documents executed on or about July 19, 1967, were 
an integrated contract and that those documents would determine 
the rights and obligations of the parties to this action. 
Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, loaned $400,000 to 
Defendant Merrill Bean Chevrolet/ Inc.f at 7% interest with a 
20-year amortization repayment program. 
One of the terms of the agreement provided as follows: 
Page 2 
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"The bank agrees that the interest rate will be 
reduced to 6.5% in consideration of the mainte-
nance by you if your commercial checking account 
with the bank and the offering by you to its 
Bankloan Department of new and used automobile 
and truck contracts which meet the lending policy 
of said bank * * *• 
Subsequent to 1967, the plaintiff discontinued purchase 
of defendant's automobile dealer contracts claiming that they no 
longer met the lending policy of the bank. Defendant later 
withdrew its checking account from plaintiff's bank and plaintiff 
seeks to enforce the 7% rather than the 6.5% interest rate on the 
loan. 
The additional amount of payments required at 7% total 
more than $24,000. There is no evidence that the 7% interest 
rate is an unreasonable rate considering the time and circum-
stances of this transaction. 
Defendant claims that plaintiff's failure to accept 
defendant's dealer paper caused defendant to shop elsewhere for 
banking services and that other banks would not finance defen-
dant's dealer paper unless defendant transferred its checking 
account to the bank. Thusf defendant was forced to transfer its 
checking account and plaintiff then increased the interest rate 
to 7% on the loan. Defendant argues that plaintiff's refusal to 
accept defendant's dealer paper made it impossible for defendant 
Page 3 
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to perform the terms of the contract. In addition to impossibil-
ity of performance, defendant also raises the defenses of 
equitable estoppel. Defendant also argues that the contract 
constitutes a "tying agreement" in violation of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1970. 
The contract clearly allows the bank to stop purchasing 
contracts if the bank determines that they no longer meet the 
lending policy of the bank. I find that the bank has not commit-
ted any acts that violate the terms of the contract. The issue 
then becomes whether or not the contract is an illegal "tying 
agreement". The loan on its face is a 7% loan which provides for 
a .5% discount under certain conditions. The contract also 
allows plaintiff to unilaterally determine whether or not it will 
accept defendant's dealer paper thus making it difficult, if not 
impossible, for defendant to qualify for the discount. 
I find that the fact plaintiff has the ability by 
contract to unilaterally determine whether or not defendant will 
qualify for a .5% discount on the loan interest: rate does not 
make the contract a "tying agreement". The cases cited by 
defendant, most specifically, Costner v. Elount Nat, Bank of 




Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 95147 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
Plaintiff is to prepare findings, conclusions and judgment 
consistent with this decision. 
DATED this J>^ day of September, 1986. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2 0 day of September, 
1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was served upon the 
following: 
Jeffrey W. Shields 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
50 South Main, Suite 2011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
David E. Bean 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
190 South Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
August 22, 1986 Commercial Security Bank vs. Merrill Eean 
1 THE COURT: At the very least I will try to narrow 
2 the issues to the extent that I can prior to taking others 
3 under advisement. 
4 i will find as a matter of law that the Statute of Limit-
5
 ations defense, defense of laches, are not persuasive to me. 
6 And I will grant the Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff 
7 os those two issues. 
8 i find that the documents that were executed on or about 
9 July 19th, I am talking about the loan commitment letter 
10 and accompanying documentsf are an integrated contract. And foij 
11 purposes of this case and this notion, that those documents 
12 will determine what the rights and obligations of both parties 
13 are. 
14 That other documents or conversations or discussions leadirj 
15 UP to those are not admissible in evidence. 
16 The primary issue in my opinion is whether or not this is, 
1? or is not, a tying agreement. Other issues have been raised, 
i8
 estoppel, impossibility of performance, that sort of thing. 
19 I think those are all kind of tied tonether, and I should 
20
 probably consider all of those at the same time in makinc my 
21
 decision. I will take the case under advisement, and I *-ili 
22
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JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815 
Telephone: (801) 535-1054 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STTE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, ) Civil No. CV-095yJl47 
a Delaware corporation. ) 
Defendant. ) 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of the plaintiff having come 
duly before hearing before the Court, the Honorable David Roth, 
judge, presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff 
having appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and 
the defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean, 
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard arguments of counsel 
and having reviewed the briefs submitted by counsel, and having made 
a partial ruling from the bench at that time, and having taken other 
issues remaining under advisement, and having heretofore made and 
entered its written ruling on plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment herein, and being herein advised in the premises, the Court 
now makes and enters its; 
FINDINGS OF FACT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, loaned the sum of 
/// J 
$400,000.00 to defendant Merrill Bean Chevrolet on or about July 19f 
1967 under the terms of a loan committment letter of that date. 
2. Said loan committment letter of July 19, 1967 provided 
for said loan of $400,000.00 at a 7% rate of interest with a 20 year 
amortization repayment program. One of the terms of that agreement 
provided specifically as follows: 
"The Bank agrees that the interest rate will be reduced to 
6.5 percent in consideration of the maintenance by you of 
your commercial checking account with the Bank and the 
offering by you to its Bankloan Department of new and used 
automobile and truck contracts which meet the lending policy 
of said Bank * * *." 
3. Subsequent to 1967f the plaintiff discontinued purchase 
of the automobile dealer contracts including those of the defendant. 
Defendant later withdrew its checking account from the plaintiff's 
bank and the plaintiff seeks to enforce the 7% rather than 6.5 % 
interest rate on the loan. 
4. The additional amount of payments remaining at the 
maturity of the obligation at the 7% interest rate total in excess 
of $24,000.00 and as prayed in the plaintiff's complaint. 
5. There is no evidence that the 7% interest rate is an 
unreasonable rate considering the time at which this loan was made 
and the circumstances under which the transaction was consumated. 
6. Defendant claims that the plaintiff's failure to accept 
defendant's dealer paper caused the defendant to shop elsewhere for 
banking services and that other banks would not finance defendant's 
dealer paper unless defendant transferred its checking account to 
that bank. Thus, defendant argues that it was forced to transfer 
its checking account and plaintiff then increased the interest rate 
to 7% on the loan. Defendant further argues that the plaintiff's 
refusal to accept defendant's dealer paper made it impossible for 
the defendant to perform the terms of the contract. 
7. In addition, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's 
refusal to accept the defendant's dealer paper made it impossible 
for the defendant to perform under the terms of the contract and in 
addition to the impossibility of performance argument defendant also 
argues that the plaintiff is equitably estopped from enforcing the 
higher 7% rate against it. Defendant also argues that the contract 
constitutes an unlawful "tying agreement" in violation on the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1970. 
8. This obligation is secured by a note and deed of trust 
upon the defendant's dealership property whichf by its terms, 
affords the plaintiff a power of sale upon default. 
Having heretofore made its Findings of Factf the Court, being 
duly informed in the premises, now makes and enters its; 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The loan committment letter of July 19, 1967 constitutes 
a contract between the parties which allows the plaintiff Bank to 
stop purchasing dealer contracts from the defendant if the Bank 
determines that such contracts no longer meet the lending policy of 
the Bank; the Bank changed policy to discontinue purchase of dealer 
contracts from any dealers which it was entitled to do under the 
contract. 
2. By terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer 
contracts, the Court concludes that the Bank has not committed any 
act or acts which violate the terms of the contract. 
3. Under the terms of the contractf the Court finds that the 
plaintiff has the ability to unilaterally determine whether or not 
the defendant will qualify for the .5 % discount on the loan 
interest rate and therefore, the acts of the plaintiff in 
terminating the purchase of the defendant's dealer contract did not 
render the defendant's performance under the contract impossible. 
4. The Court finds that the terms of the July 19f 1967 loan 
committment letter do not render the contract an unlawful tying 
agreement under the terms of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970, 
or the Sherman Act. 
5. The note and deed of trust along with the July 19f 1967 
committment letter are the three documents which comprise the 
entirety of this transaction, and the Court finds that the same are 
integrated contracts containing all of the terms and agreements as 
between the parties, and the Court therefore does not consider any 
other document or communication as modifying the terms of the 
agreement stated by said 3 documents. 
6. The plaintiff's complaint is not barred by the applicable 
Statute of Limitations. 
7. The plaintiff's complaint is not barred or limited by the 
equitable doctrine of Laches. 
8. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum prayed 
for in its complaint, and is entitled to a decree of this Court 
allowing it to foreclose the security interest set forth in the deed 
of trust which is an issue in this action as a note and a mortgage 
and to its attorney's fees and costs of court as therein provided or 
by power of sale. 
WHEREFORE, having hereinabove made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, judgment shall enter thereon 
accordingly. 
DATED this &> day of December, 1986 
BY THE COURT: 
David Roth 
Second District Judge 
ApfSroyed as to 
^^y 
David E. BeSfP^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815 
Telephone: (801) 53 5-1054 
I Recorded Book JiO •( \ 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH > /Y 
\ 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MERRILL BEAN CHEVROLET, 






Civil No. CV-095jPTl47 
The motion of the plaintiff for Summary Judgment having come 
duly before the Court for hearing, the Honorable David Rothf Judge, 
presiding, on the 22nd day of August, 1986, and the plaintiff having 
appeared by and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and 
defendant having appeared by and through counsel, David E. Bean, 
Bean and Smedley, and the Court having heard agruments of counsel 
and having reviewed the briefs and memoranda of the parties filed 
herein, and being duly advised in the premises, and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Lav/, and being prepared to rule thereon, it is now by the Court: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That plaintiff is awarded judgment as against the £>*^.. 
defendant in the sum of $24,455.16 principal, $5,710.96 of accrued „£• 
interest from June 1, 1983 until October 2, 1986 and thereafter -*-^ ^ 
accruing at the rate of $4.75 
Pa£057 
Indexed . . • 
per diem and the sum of $222.85 for 
advanced costs in reference to said deed of trust; 
2. For the additional sum of $5,000.00 as and for attorney's 
fees; 
3. For the further sum of $56.75 as costs of Court; 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose as against the 
defendant that certain deed of trust dated and executed on the 3rd 
day of August, 1967 and recorded on the records of the Weber County 
Recorder, State of Utah as Entry Number 494442, Book 872, Pages 271 
through 273 inclusive for the purpose of enforcing and collecting 
the sum of money awarded as judgment hereinabove, the same being 
secured by said deed of trust, and the Weber County Sheriff is 
authorized by these premises to conduct a sale thereon and to assess 
any deficiency thereafter due. 
DATED this / ^ day of December, 1986. 
BY THE COU 
rid Roth, 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
^50 
David E. Bean 
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of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is, therefore, not 
entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 (1977 Supp.). 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
is granted as prayed for, insofar as it is the 
Court's findings and conclusions for the rea-
sons herein stated that the defendants' con-
duct here complained of by the plaintiff is a 
violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution and pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. 1343(4). 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants 
herein, and their agents and successors, are 
permanently enjoined from permitting, au-
thorizing, or condoning the saying of public 
prayers by the students of the Chandler 
Unified School District at the student as-
semblies at Chandler High School, Chan-
dler, Arizona. 
(O I *fyWJHBf*SYSJfJM> 
STERLING COAL COMPANY, INC. 
v. 
UNITED AMERICAN BANK IN 
KNOXVILLE. 
Civ. No. 3-78-330. 
United States District Court, 
E. D. Tennessee, N. D. 
March 29, 1979. 
In action under the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970, defendant 
moved for summary judgment. The Dis-
trict Court, Robert L. Taylor, J., held that: 
(1) no violation of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970 occurred by 
bank's conditioning the grant and extension 
of credit to new, closely held corporation 
upon requirement that bank supervise and 
control corporation's checking account and 
other corporate affairs, including veto pow-
er over purchases and payment of dividends 
and that corporation guarantee personal in-
debtedness of its two sole stockholders, but 
(2) issues of fact precluding summary judg-
ment existed with respect to claims that 
defendant required utilization of defend-
ant's legal counsel, that defendant required 
plaintiff to enter into exclusive sales agree-
ments, and that defendant prohibited utili-
zation by plaintiff of banking services at 
other banks. 
Motion granted in part 
1. Banks and Banking *»521 
No violation of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970 occurred by 
bank's conditioning the grant of extension 
of credit to new, closely held corporation 
upon requirement that bank supervise and 
control corporation's checking account and 
other corporate affairs, including veto pow-
er over purchases and payment of dividends 
and that corporation guarantee personal in-
debtedness of its two sole stockholders. 
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments 
of 1970, § 106(bX3), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1972(3). 
2. Banks and Banking «=>521 
Though requirement that certain bank 
related to defendant bank provide funds 
needed as condition to grant of extension of 
credit by defendant bank could amount to 
violation of the Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970, there could be no 
recovery by borrower in absence of any 
showing of damage flowing from such re-
quirement. Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1972. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»2487 
Issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment existed with respect to claims 
that bank violated the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act Amendments of 1970 by requir-
ing, in the extension of credit to plaintiff, 
utilization of defendant's legal counsel by 
requiring that plaintiff enter into exclusive 
sales agreement, and by prohibiting utiliza-
tion by plaintiff of banking services of oth-
er banks. Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1972; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 56, 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
STERLING COAL CO. v. UNITED AMERICAN BANK, ETC. 965 
Citeas470F.Supp.964 (1979) 
Harold B. Stone, Knoxville, Tenn., for 
plaintiff. 
W. F. Shumate, Jr., William G. Cockrill, 
Knoxville, Tenn., for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM 
ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge. 
This is an action under Section 106 of the 
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments 
of 1970,12 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. Specifical-
ly plaintiff alleges that defendant violated 
12 U.S.C. § 1972 by placing a series of 
conditions upon the extension of credit to 
plaintiff. Defendant has moved for sum-
mary judgment Plaintiff has filed a brief 
in opposition. The record shows that as to 
several of plaintiffs claims there is no gen-
uine issue as to any material fact and de-
fendant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Accordingly the Court grants de-
fendant's motion in part. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. 
[1] Plaintiff alleges that defendant vio-
lated Section 1972(1) by conditioning the 
grant and extension of credit upon the re-
quirement Jhat the defendant supervise and 
control plaintiff's checking account and oth-
er corporate affairs, including veto power 
over purchases and payment of dividends. 
Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated 
Section 1972(3) by requiring plaintiff to as-
sume the personal liability of its two sole 
stockholders and requiring it to pay interest 
on the personal loans of one of the two 
stockholders. Plaintiff specifically alleges 
that plaintiff was forced to borrow $54,000 
from a Nashville bank related to defendant, 
for the purpose of paying this interest. 
The record demonstrates, and there is no 
dispute, that plaintiff obtained financing 
from defendant at a time at which it pos-
sessed few, if any, assets by which to secure 
any loans. The principal officer, whose per-
sonal liability plaintiff was forced to as-
sume was, along with his wife, the sole 
stockholder of plaintiff. Section 1972 was 
not intended to interfere with the conduct 
of traditional banking practices. Clark v. 
United Bank of Denver National Associa-
tion, 480 F2d 235, 238 (10th Cir.), cert 
denied, 414 U.S. 1004, 94 S.Ct. 360, 38 
L.Ed.2d 240 (1973); Swerdloff v. Miami Na-
tional Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir. 1978). 
The Act does not prohibit attempts by 
banks to protect their investments. These 
requirements, as demonstrated by this rec-
ord, clearly were connected to the loans 
provided by the defendant. While there 
are many contested issues of fact in the 
record, they are not material to the resolu-
tion of these claims. The Court would be 
surprised indeed if a bank were to loan 
large sums to a new, closely held corpora-
tion without obtaining control over its dis-
bursements and without requiring a corpo-
rate guarantee of the indebtedness of its 
sole stockholders. 
[2] Plaintiffs claim that it was forced 
to borrow $54,000 from a particular Nash-
ville bank in order to pay interest on a loan 
must also be dismissed. While such a claim 
could amount to a violation of the Act, 
plaintiff has failed to allege or show any 
damages flowing from this requirement. 
Plaintiff could legitimately be required to 
pay interest on the loan to its major share-
holder. Unless the further requirement 
that a particular bank provide the funds 
damaged plaintiff in some way, there could 
be no recovery under the Act. 
[3] The Court notes that it is granting 
summary judgment only as to certain of 
plaintiff's theories. The parties will pro-
ceed to trial upon plaintiffs theories that 
defendant required the utilization of de-
fendant's legal counsel, that defendant re-
quired plaintiff to enter into an exclusive 
sales agreement with National Energy Re-
sources and that defendant prohibited the 
utilization by plaintiff of banking services 
at other banks. 
For the foregoing reasons it is OR-
DERED that defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment be, and the same hereby is, 
granted in part _ 
Order Accordingly. 
( O t
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it must be such as to exclude every rea-
sonable hypothesis other than that of 
guilt. There is some support for this type 
of instruction in the lower court decisions 
[citing cases], but the better rule is that 
where the jury is properly instructed on 
the standards for reasonable doubt, such 
an additional instruction on circumstan-
tial evidence is confusing and incorrect 
This Circuit has followed the holding of 
Holland United States v. Eisner, 533 F.2d 
987, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1976); United States 
v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1974); 
United States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371, 373 
(6th Cir. 1972). 
Defendant Scott has cited a contrary de-
cision of this Court, United States v. La-
Rose, 459 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1972), 
which followed the minority rule expressly 
disapproved in Holland. The LaRose Court 
cited only one Tenth Circuit case and one 
Fifth Circuit case as authority, and reached 
a result contrary to Sixth Circuit authority 
existing at the time, without citing either it 
or Holland. United States v. Luxenberg, 
374 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Conti, 339 F.2d 10, 12-13 (6th Cir. 
1964), (both Luxenberg and Conti citing 
Holland, as well as earlier Sixth Circuit 
cases). 
Accordingly, the decision in LaRose can 
be regarded only as an aberration, and will 
not be followed by us in this case. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Government, Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 
86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), we hold that substan-
tial and competent evidence supported the 
jury's verdict. See United States v. Eisner, 
533 F.2d at 989-90. The jury was entitled 
to infer guilt from the facts in evidence, 
and to reject Scott's weak alternative theo-
ry of his actions on the night of March 4th 
and of his. possession of the stolen money. 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
(o | « Y NUMBER$YS*fM> 
Paul Kermit COSTNER, Jr., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 




United States Court of Appeals, 
Sixth Circuit. 
Argued April 7, 1978. 
Decided June 29, 1978 
Action was instituted to hold defendant 
bank civilly liable for violating antitying 
provisions of Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970 and Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, 
Robert L. Taylor, J., entered judgment on 
verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Merntt, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) whether tying ar-
rangement which occurred when defendant 
bank, as a condition to making a loan to 
permit plaintiff to purchase stock in an 
automobile dealership, required dealership 
to sell a substantial share of its commercial 
installment paper to bank, was such as to 
increase cost of doing business and led, 
along with other factors, to decline of busi-
ness and direct damage to plaintiff was 
question for jury, (2) there was sufficient 
evidence to justify finding that plaintiff, as 
distinct from automobile dealership, suf-
fered direct damage as a result of arrange-
ment and that plaintiff, therefore, had 
standing to claim damages, (3) whether a 
"not insubstantial" amount of commerce 
was affected by arrangement and whether 
defendant bank possessed "appreciable eco-
nomic power" in the market for the tying 
product were questions for jun in resolving 
claim under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
but (4) e\en if evidence of market power 
and effect on interstate commerce was in-
COSTNER v. BLOUNT NAT. BANK OF MARYVILLE, TENN. 
Cite as 578 FJd 1192 (1978) 
warrant submission of claim 3. Monopolies s=»28(7.1) 
1193 
sufficient to 
under Sherman Anti-Trust Act, where bank 
was also sued under Bank Holding Compa-
ny Act Amendments of 1970, which estab-
lished a per se rule and provided same 
penalties for tying arrangements, but with-
out necessity of proving any economic pow-
er in the market for the tying product, 
failure to direct a verdict on claim under 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act was harmless er-
ror. 
Affirmed. 
1. Monopolies e=>28(8) 
Whether tying arrangement which oc-
curred when defendant bank, as a condition 
to making loan to permit plaintiff to pur-
chase stock in an automobile dealership, 
required dealership to sell a substantial 
share of its commercial installment paper to 
bank was such as to increase cost of doing 
business and led, along with other factors, 
to decline of business and direct damage to 
plaintiff, was question of fact for jury in 
action to hold bank civilly liable for violat-
ing antitying provisions of Bank Holding 
Company Act Amendments of 1970 and 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et 
seq., Bank Holding Company Act Amend-
ments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1972. 
1 Monopolies <s=>28(7.6) 
There was sufficient evidence to justify 
a finding that plaintiff, as distinct from 
automobile dealership in which he held a 
substantial stock ownership, suffered direct 
iamage as a result of illegal tying arrange-
ment with defendant bank in connection 
with personal loan and that plaintiff, there-
fore, had standing to claim damages from 
irrangement in an action to hold bank civil-
y liable for violating antitying provisions 
)f Bank Holding Company Act Amend-
ments of 1970 and Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
Sherman Anti-Tmst Act, § 1 et seq., 15 
LJ.S.CA. § 1 et seq.; Bank Holding Compa-
ly Act Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1972. 
To show a per se violation of antitying 
provisions of Sherman Anti-Trust Act, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant 
possesses "appreciable economic power" in 
the market for the tying product and that 
the tying arrangement affects a "not insub-
stantial" amount of commerce in the tied 
product Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1 et 
seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. 
4. Monopolies «=>28(8) 
Whether a "not insubstantial" amount 
of commerce was affected by tying ar-
rangement which occurred when defendant 
bank, as a condition to making a loan to 
plaintiff to purchase stock in an automobile 
dealership, required dealership to sell a sub-
stantial share of its commercial installment 
paper to bank and whether bank possessed 
"appreciable economic power," that is, 
whether it was able to impose unusual and 
burdensome conditions on plaintiff as a con-
dition to granting loan, were questions for 
jury in action to hold bank civilly liable for 
violating antitying provisions of Sherman 
'Anti-Trust Act Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
§ 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. 
5. Monopolies «=» 17(2.5) 
Plaintiff, who sought to hold defendant 
bank civilly liable for violating antitying 
provisions of Sherman Anti-Trust Act, was 
not required to show that bank had a mo-
nopoly or even a dominant position in the 
market, but was required to show the type 
of "leverage" or economic power which 
would allow the bank to raise prices or to 
require purchasers to accept burdensome 
terms that could not be exacted in a com-
pletely competitive market Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, § 1 et seq., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et 
seq. 
6. Federal Courts <s=>907 
Even if evidence of market power and 
effect on interstate commerce was insuffi-
cient to warrant submission of claim 
against defendant bank under antitying 
provisions of Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
where bank was also sued under Bank 
Holding Company Act Amendments of 
1970, which established a per se rule and 
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provided same penalties for tying arrange-
ments, but without necessity of proving any 
economic power in market for tying prod-
uct, failure to direct a verdict on claim 
under Sherman Anti-Trust Act was harm-
less error, particularly in light of fact that 
jury charge was in all respects correct. 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, § 1 et seq., 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.; Bank Holding Compa-
ny Act Amendments of 1970, § 106(b), 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1972. 
Jackson C. Kramer, James A. Ridley, III, 
David E. Rodgers, Kramer, Johnson, Ray-
son, Greenwood & McVeigh, Knoxville, 
Tenn., for defendant-appellant. 
Norman H. Williams, J. Edward Ingram, 
Fowler, Rowntree, Fowler & Robertson, 
Knoxville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee. 
Before LIVELY and MERRITT, Circuit 
Judges, and RUBIN, District Judge.* 
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A jury found the defendant bank civilly 
liable for violating the anti-tying provisions 
of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 1972 and the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1. The Bank Holding Company 
Act in essence applies the general anti-ty-
ing principles of the Sherman Act to the 
context of commercial banking, by prohibit-
ing a bank, when it makes a loan, from 
requiring in return some business or service 
Co Che bank other than Che usual obligations 
directly related to ensuring timely repay-
ment of the loan. A damage award of 
$60,000 was trebled by the District Court in 
accordance with both acts. 
The tying arrangement was created when 
the plaintiff Costner, owner of 50% of the 
stock in an automobile dealership, obtained 
a $420,000 personal loan from the defendant 
bank to buy the remaining stock in the 
company. Costner pledged all of the stock 
to secure repayment of the loan. The loan 
• Honorable Carl B. Rubin, Judge, United State 
sitting by designation. 
agreement imposed several conditions af-
fecting the operation of the business, in-
cluding a requirement that the corporation 
sell a substantial share of its retail commer-
cial automobile installment paper to the 
bank, and that it employ a person designat-
ed by the bank to ensure compliance with 
the tying arrangement. 
On appeal, the bank concedes that the 
agreement violated the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act. Its major contentions are that 
the illegal tying arrangement did not dam-
age the plaintiff and did not sufficiently 
affect interstate commerce to constitute a 
violation of the Sherman Act. We affirm 
the decision below. 
The uncontroverted evidence shows that 
the automobile dealership experienced fi-
nancial difficulties, and approximately eigh-
teen months after the loan agreement and 
tying arrangement were entered into, the 
bank demanded payment of the personal 
loan. Threatened with foreclosure of the 
stock he had pledged as collateral for the 
loan, the plaintiff assigned his stock to the 
bank under an agreement which allowed 
the bank to find a purchaser for the stock 
at a price to be determined by the bank in 
negotiations with the purchaser. The bank 
agreed, in exchange, to make certain pay-
ments and to cancel the plaintiffs obliga-
tion to pay off the principal balance of the 
loan plus another personal loan, for a total 
value of approximately $420,000. The bank 
vice president who had handled the plain-
tiffs loan then sold the automobile dealer-
ship to a group headed by his brother for a 
price which did not return to plaintiff any 
value above the value of the cancellation of 
the indebtedness. 
II. CAUSATION 
The plaintiffs theory of causation and 
damage was that the tying arrangement 
increased the costs of doing business and 
that this fact, among others, led to the 
decline of the business. The decline of the 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 
COSTNER v. BLOUNT NAT. BANK OF MARYVILLE, TENN. H 9 5 
Cite as 578 F.2d 1192 (1978) 
business in turn put the bank in a position 
to call the loan and to force the plaintiff to 
sell the business to the vice president's 
brother for a price considerably below the 
fair market value of the business. The jury 
award of $60,000 indicates that the jury 
accepted the plaintiffs theory. 
The bank agrees that the jury instruc-
tions given by the district court were cor-
rect, and the bank does not object to any of 
the evidentiary rulings of the district court. 
The bank argues rather that the plaintiffs 
theory of causation and the evidence intro-
duced to support it were insufficient to 
permit a jury finding that the illegal tying 
arrangement caused damage to the plain-
tiff. 
(1] We have reviewed the record and 
the evidence presented to the jury and, like 
the District Court, we are unable to say 
that the evidence was insufficient to justify 
a finding of causation by the jury. There 
was evidence that general economic condi-
tions and poor management caused a de-
cline in plaintiffs business, but there was 
also evidence that the illegal tying arrange-
ments contributed to the decline. In cases 
of this kind, it is for the jury, as the trier of 
facts, to determine the question of causa-
tion. We cannot say under the circum-
stances that the jury's verdict was unfair 
and should be set aside. 
III. STANDING 
[2] The bank's argument that the plain-
tiff has no standing to claim damages turns 
on a preliminary finding of fact, and the 
district court put that question of fact to 
the jury in its instructions: 
However, plaintiff would not be entitled 
to damages solely upon a finding by the 
jury that the tying arrangement resulted in 
damages to the car dealership. . . . If 
plaintiff is to recover he must prove that as 
a result of the tying arrangement the sale 
of his stock in the corporation was for less 
than its fair market value at the time. The 
injury to the stockholder must be direct and 
not merely consequential or derivative 
through the corporation. Depreciation in 
the value of the stock that occurred before 
the sale of the stock because of injuries 
directly affecting the corporation rather 
than the shareholder cannot be recovered. 
The sale of the stock must result in further 
loss to the shareholder and not merely sub-
stitute the already depreciated value of the 
stock for money of equal value. 
The District Court apparently gave this 
charge to the jury upon the submission of 
the bank, and we believe there is sufficient 
evidence to justify a finding that the plain-
tiff, as distinct from the automobile dealer-
ship, suffered direct damage as a result of 
the illegal tying arrangement See Perkins 
v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 89 S.Ct. 
1871, 23 L.Ed.2d 599 (1969); Pogue v. Inter-
national Industries, Inc., 524 F.2d 342 (6th 
Cir. 1975). 
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE UNDER THE 
SHERMAN ACT 
[3] The bank contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant submitting 
the plaintiffs Sherman Act claim to the 
jury. To show a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant possesses "appreciable 
economic power" in the market for the ty-
ing product and that the tying arrangement 
affects a "not insubstantial" amount of 
commerce in the tied product. U. S. Steel 
Corp. v. Fortner Enterprisest 429 U.S. 610, 
611-612, 97 S.Ct. 861, 51 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977) 
(Fortner II). In this case, the tying prod-
uct is credit and the tied product is the 
automobile dealership's consumer commer-
cial paper. The District Court gave a full 
and accurate charge to the jury, setting out 
the elements which had to be proved in 
order to find a violation of the Sherman 
Act. The bank does not assert that the 
jury instructions were erroneous, but rather 
that the evidence was insufficient to go to 
the jury. 
[4,5] We believe it is clear that the 
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that a "not insubstantial" 
amount of commerce was affected. The 
bank's answers to interrogatories show that 
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the volume of consumer automobile paper 
purchased by the bank from the corporation 
during relevant periods was as follows: 
VOLUME 
DATE NUMBER AMOUNT 
9-21-73 to 12-31-73 104 $ 362.509.97 
1- 1-74 to 12-31-74 524 $1,855,748.59 
1- 1-75 to 2- 5-75 41 $ 135,525.34 
In Fortner Enterprises v. United States 
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502, 89 S.Ct. 1252, 
22 L.Ed.2d 495 (1969) (Fortner I) the Su-
preme Court held that even when the total 
volume of tied sales amounted to only 
$190,000, a not insubstantial volume of com-
merce was affected. 
The question of economic power in the 
credit market presents a somewhat more 
difficult problem. The plaintiff was not 
required to show that the bank had a mo-
nopoly or even a dominant position in the 
market (Fortner 7, 394 U.S. at 502, 89 S.Ct. 
1252). However, the plaintiff was required 
to show the type of "leverage" or economic 
power which would allow the bank to "raise 
prices or to require purchasers to accept 
burdensome terms that could not be exact-
ed in a completely competitive market." 
(Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 618, 620, 97 S.Ct. 
861, 867). Certainly, there is evidence in 
the record that the defendant bank was 
aBle to impose unusual and burdensome 
conditions on the plaintiff as a condition to 
granting the loan. The record also indi-
cates that the defendant was one of two 
banks in the community that competed for 
business with Costner. Finally, it appears 
that the plaintiffs efforts during 1973-74 
to obtain additional credit or arrange out-
side investment in the company from other 
sources were not successful. 
[6] Although the evidence on the bank's 
economic leverage was therefore weak, we 
are reluctant to conclude that it was insuf-
ficient as a matter of law to warrant suln 
mission to the jury. However, a definitive 
resolution of this question is unnecessary 
because we are unable to see how the bank 
was prejudiced even if submission of the 
Sherman Act claim to the jury was incor-
rect. The hank was also sued under the 
Bank Holding Company Act, which estab-
lishes a per se rule and provides the same 
penalties for tying arrangements as the 
Sherman Act, but without the necessitv of 
proving any economic power in the market 
for the tying product: 
Because of their inherent anticompetitive 
effects, which may operate to the detri-
ment of bank customers as well as bank-
ing and nonbanking competitors, tying 
arrangements involving a bank are made 
unlawful by this section without any 
showing of specific adverse effects on 
competition or other restraints of trade 
and without any showing of some degree 
of bank dominance or control over the 
tying product or service. Moreover, as 
individual tying arrangements may in-
volve only relatively small amounts, the 
prohibitions of this section are applicable 
regardless of the amount of commerce 
involved. 
[Sen.Rep. No. 97-1084, 91st Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1970), [1970] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad-
min.News 5519, 5558 (Supplementary 
Views of Edward W. Brooke)]. 
We believe, therefore, that even if the evi-
dence of market power and effect on inter-
state commerce were insufficient to war-
rant submission of the Sherman Act claim 
to the jury, the District Court's failure to 
direct a verdict on that claim was harmless 
error, particularly in light of the fact that 
the jury charge was in all respects correct. 
The verdict would have been the same if 
the Bank Holding Company Act alone had 
been submitted. 
Accordingly, we decline to set aside the 
jury verdict in this case and affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
A P P E N D I X " A - 9 " 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-1 
CHAPTER 4 
MARKETING WOOL 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102) 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 
Repeal. 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of wool, 
Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L. 1931, ch. 54, w e r e repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102. 
§§1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-4-1 to 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another — When not required to be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. No estate or interest in 
real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other-
wise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 33-5-1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statute, Comp. Laws 
1876, § 1010. 
Cross-References. 
Contract for sale of goods for $500 or more 
unenforceable in absence of some writing, 
70A-2-201. 
Enforceability of security interests, 
70A-9-203. 
Securities sales, statute of frauds for con-
tracts, 70A-8-319. 
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal 
property not otherwise covered, 70A-1-206. 
Construction and application. 
This section does not apply unless there is 
a contract. Skeen v. Van Sickle (1932) 80 U 
419,15 P 2d 344. 
The meaning of the word "interest" in this 
section depends on statutory construction 
governed by legislative intent. In re Reyn-
olds' Estate (1936) 90 U 415, 62 P 2d 270. 
Sale implies creation of an estate in excess 
of a leasehold, by act of the owner. Lewis v. 
Dahl (1945) 108 U 486,161 P 2d 362,160 ALR 
1040. 
Adjoining landowners. 
The statute of frauds applies to adjacent 
landowners, as well as to persons who are 
not so situated. Tripp v. Bagley (1928) 74 U 
57, 276 P 912, 69 ALR 1417, distinguished in 
10 U 2d 370, 353 P 2d 911. 
Agent's authority. 
Where, at time agreement for purchase of 
land was entered into, there was no statute 
requiring agent's authority to contract for 
purchase of real estate to be in writing, con-
tract would not be invalidated. Le Vine v. 
17 
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rejected written offer. Mendelson v. Roland 
(1926) 66 U 487, 243 P 798. 
Surrender, release or discharge. 
Surrender of interest under contract for 
purchase of land could be properly effected 
without deed or conveyance in writing in 
compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron 
(1917) 51 U 234,169 P 745. 
Collateral References. 
Frauds, Statute of <&= 71 et seq. 
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 90 et seq. 
72 AmJur 2d 616 et seq., Statute of Frauds 
§ 59 et seq. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In 
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within 
one year from the making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration 
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to 
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator 
or intestate out of his own estate. 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L. 
1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 33-5-4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws 
1876, §1014; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§2835, 
3918,4219. 
Affirmative defense. 
When action is on contract, admitted by 
defendant, he must interpose special plea of 
statute if statute is to be available as 
defense. Abba v. Smyth (1899) 21 U 109, 59 
P756. 
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party 
relying upon it as a defense. M & S Constr. 
& Engineering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank 
(1967) 19 U 2d 86, 426 P 2d 227. 
Defendant, who answered by a general 
denial and simultaneous motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs claim as being barred under 
subsec. (2) of this section, proceeded improp-
erly, since under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a 
ground for motion to dismiss but rather an 
affirmative defense under Rule 8(c). W. W. & 
W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas (1970) 24 U 2d 
264, 470 P 2d 252. 
Alteration or modification of original con-
tract. 
If original contract, to be binding and 
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of 
frauds, is required to be in writing and sub-
scribed by parties sought to be charged, then 
a subsequent agreement altering or modify-
ing any of its material parts or terms is also 
required to be in writing and so subscribed, 
no part performance or anything done by 
such party in reliance on the subsequent 
agreement being alleged or proved, especially 
if interest in land is involved. Combined Met-
als, Inc. v. Bastian (1928) 71 U 535, 267 P 
1020, distinguished in 100 U 516, 116 P 2d 
578. 
Parties may modify orally an agreement in 
writing where the original contract is not 
required by statute of frauds to be in writing, 
at least where there is consideration for such 
modification. But a contract required by stat-
ute of frauds to be in writing cannot be mod-
ified by a subsequent oral agreement, 
although this rule is subject to many excep-
tions, the first great division coming between 
executory and executed modifications. 
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc. 
(1935) 88 U 194, 48 P 2d 489, affirmed on 
rehearing 88 U 213, 53 P 2d 1153. 
An oral modification of a contract required 
to be in writing, when such modification is 
fully executed, is taken out of the statute. In 
31 
2-28-83 Bank Holding Company Act 6061 
TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
AN ACT 
To amend the Bank Holding Company of 1956, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970". 
• * * * • • * * * • * * 
SEC. 106 (a) As used in this section, the terms "bank'*, "bank holding company", 
"subsidiary", and "Board" ha\e the meaning ascribed to such terms in section 2 of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956. For purposes of this section only, the term "company", as 
used in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, means any person, estate, trust, 
partnership, corporation, association, or similar organization, but does not include any 
corporation the majority of the shares of which are owned by the United States or by any 
State. The term "trust service" means any service customarily performed by a bank trust 
department. 
[Codifiedto 12 U.S.C 1971] 
[Source: Section 106(a) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L. So. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1766), effective December 31, 1970] 
(b)(1) A bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of any kind, 
or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any of the foregoing, on the 
condition or requirement— 
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or service from 
such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service; 
(B) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or sen ice from 
a bank holding company of such bank, or from any other subsidiary of such bank holding 
company; 
(C) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or service to such 
bank, other than those related to and usually provided in connection with a loan, discount, 
deposit, or trust service; 
(D) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or . rvice to a 
bank holding company of such bank, or to any other subsidiary of such bank holding 
company; or 
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or service from 
a competitor of such bank, a bank holding company of such bank, or any subsidiary of such 
bank holding company, other than a condition or requirement that such bank shall 
reasonably impose in a credit transaction to assure the soundness of the credit. 
The Board may by regulation or order permit such exceptions to the foregoing prohibition as 
it considers will not be contrary to the purposes of this section. 
(2)(A) No bank which maintains a correspondent account in the name of another 
bank shall make an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of, or to any person 
who directly or indirectly or acting through or in concert with one or more persons owns, 
controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities 
of, such other bank or to any related interest of such person unless such extension of credit is 
made on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as those 
prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve 
more than the normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features. 
(B) No bank shall open a correspondent account at another bank while such bank 
has outstanding an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of, or other person 
who directly or indirectly or acting through or in concert with one or more persons owns, 
controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities 
of, the bank desiring to open the account or to any related interest of such person, unless 
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such extension of credit was made on substantially the same terms, including interest rates 
and collateral as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other persons 
and does not involve more than the normal risk of repajment or present other unfavorable 
features. 
(C) No bank which maintains a correspondent account at another bank shall make 
an extension of credit to an executive officer or director of, or to any person who directly or 
indirectly acting through or in concert with one or more persons owns, controls, or has the 
power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of voting securities of, such other bank 
or to any related interest of such person, unless such extension of credit is made on 
substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at the 
time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve more than the 
normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features. 
(D) No bank which has outstanding an extension of credit to an executive officer or 
director of, or to any person who directly or indirectly or acting through or in concert with 
one or more persons owns, controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of 
any class of voting securities of, another bank or to any related interest of such person shall 
open a correspondent account at such other bank, unless such extension of credit was made 
on substantially the same terms, including interest rates and collateral as those prevailing at 
the time for comparable transactions with other persons and does not involve more than the 
normal risk of repayment or present other unfavorable features. 
(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 4textension of credit'* shall have the 
meaning prescribed by the Board pursuant to section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 
U.S.C. 375b), and the term "executive officer" shall have the same meaning given it under 
section 22(g) of the Federal Reserve Act. 
(F)(i) Any bank which violates or any officer, director, employee, agent, or other 
person participating in the conduct of the afTairs of such bank who violates any provision of 
section 106(b)(2) shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 per day for 
each day during which such violation continues: Provided, That the agency having authority 
to impose a civil money penalty may, in its discretion compromise, modify, or remit any civil 
money penalty w hich is subject to imposition or has been imposed under such authority. The 
penalty may be assessed and collected by the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a 
national bank, the Board in the case of a State member bank, or the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation in the case of an insured nonmember State bank, by written notice. 
As used in this section, the term "violates** includes without any limitation any action (alone 
or with another or others) for or toward causing, bringing about, participating in, 
counselling, or aiding or abetting a violation. 
(ii) In determining the amount of the penalty the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as the case may be, shall take into 
account the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the financial resources 
and good faith of the bank or person charged, the gravity of the violation, the history of 
previous violations, and such other matters as justice may require. 
(iii) The bank or person assessed shall be afforded an opportunity for agency 
hearing, upon request made within ten days after issuance of the notice of assessment. In 
such hearing, all issues shall be determined on the record pursuant to section 554 of title 5, 
United States Code. The agency determination shall be made by final order which may be 
reviewed only as provided in subsection (iv). If no hearing is requested as herein provided, 
the assessment shall constitute a final and unappealable order. 
(iv) Any bank or person against whom an order imposing a civil money penalty 
has been entered after agency hearing under this section may obtain review by the United 
States court of appeals for the circuit in which the home office of the bank is located, or the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing a notice of 
appeal in such court within 20 days from the service of such order, and simultaneously 
sending a copy of such notice by registered or certified mail to the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as the case may be. The 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as 
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| the case may be, shall promptly certify and file in such court the record upon which the 
j penalty was imposed, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. The 
findings of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, as the case may be, shall be set aside if found to be unsupported by substantial 
I evidence as provided by section 706(2)(E) of title 5, United States Code. 
(v) If any bank or person fails to pay an assessment after it has become a final 
and unappealable order, or after the court of appeals has entered final judgment in favor of 
the agency, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board or the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, as the case may be, shall refer the matter to the Attorney General, who shall 
recover the amount assessed by action in the appropriate United States district court. In such 
action the validity and appropriateness of the final order imposing the penalty shall not be 
subject to review. 
(vi) The Comptroller of the Currency, the Board and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation shall promulgate regulations establishing procedures necessary to 
implement this section. 
(vii) All penalties collected under authority of this section shall be covered into 
the Treasury of the United States. 
(G)(i) Each executive officer and each stockholder of record who directly or 
indirectly owns, controls, or has the power to vote more than 10 per centum of any class of 
voting securities of an insured bank shall make a written report to the board of directors of 
such bank for any year during which such executive officer or shareholder has outstanding 
an extension of credit from a bank which maintains a corresponding account in the name of 
such bank. Such report shall include the following information: 
(1) the maximum amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining the 
correspondent account during such year of (a) such executive officer or stockholder of 
record, (b) each company controlled by such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each 
political or campaign committee the funds or services of which will benefit such executive 
officer or stockholder, or which is controlled by such executive officer or stockholder; 
(2) the amount of indebtedness to the bank maintaining the correspondent 
account outstanding as of a date not more than ten days prior to the date of filing of such 
report (a) such executive officer or stockholder of record, (b) each company controlled by 
such executive officer or stockholder, or (c) each political or campaign committee the funds 
or services of which will benefit such executive officer or stockholder; 
(3) the range of interest rates charged on such indebtedness of such executive 
officer or stockholder of record; and 
(4) the terms and conditions of such indebtedness of such executive officer or 
stockholder of record. 
(ii) The appropriate Federal banking agencies are authorized to issue rules and 
regulations, including definitions of terms, to require the reporting and public disclosure of 
information by any bank or executive officer or principal shareholder thereof concerning any 
extension of credit by a correspondent bank to the reporting bank's executive officers or 
principal shareholders, or the related interests of such persons. 
(H) For the purpose of this paragraph— 
(i) the term "bank" includes a mutual savings bank; 
(ii) the term "related interests of such persons" includes any company controlled 
by such executive officer, director, or person, or any political or campaign committee the 
funds or services of which will benefit such executive officer, director, or person or which is 
controlled by such executive officer, director, or person; and 
(iii) the terms "control of a company" and "company" have the same meaning as 
under section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 375b). 
[Codified to 12 U.S.C. 1972] 
[Source: Section 106(b) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L So. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1766). effective December 31, 1970, as amended by section 801 of title VIII of the Act of 
November 10, 1978 (Pub. L No. 95-630; 92 Stat. 3690)t effective March 10, 1979; and sections 
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410(f), 424(c), (d)(ll), (eh and 428 of title IV of the Act of October 15, 1982 (Pub. L. No. 97-
320; 96 Stat. 1520, 1523 and 1526), effective October 15, 1982] 
(c) The district courts of the United States have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain 
violations of subsection (b) of this section and it is the duty of the United States attorneys, 
under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to present and 
restrain such violations. The proceedings may be by way of a petition setting forth the case 
and praying that the violation be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties 
complained of have been duly notified of the petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as 
possible, to the hearing and determination of the case. While the petition is pending, and 
before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary' restraining order or 
prohibition as it deems just. Whenever it appears to the court that the ends of justice require 
that other parties be brought before it, the court may cause them to be summoned whether 
or not they reside in the district in which the court is held, and subpenas to that end may be 
seived in any district by the marshal thereof. 
[Codified to 12 U.S.C. 1973] 
[Source: Section 106(c) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L. So. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970] 
(d) In any action brought by or on behalf of the United States under subsection (b), 
subpenas for witnesses may run into any district, but no writ of subpena may issue for 
witnesses living out of the district in which the court is held at a greater distance than one 
hundred miles from the place of holding the same without the prior permission of the trial 
court upon proper application and cause shown. 
[Codifiedto 12 U.SC 1974] 
[Source: Section 106(d) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970] 
(e) Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in subsection (b) may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in 
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without regard to the amount in 
controversy, and shall be entitled to recover three times the amount of the damages sustained 
by him, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
[Codifiedto 12 U.SC 1975] 
[Source: Section 106(e) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970] 
(0 Any person may sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States 
having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by reason of a 
violation of subsection (b), under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief 
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equit> and 
under the rules governing such proceedings. Upon the execution of proper bond against 
damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of 
irreparable loss or damage is immediate a preliminary injunction may issue. 
[Codified to 12 U.SC 1976] 
[Source: Section 106(f) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1767), effective December 31, 1970] 
(g)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), any action to enforce any cause of action under this 
section shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action 
accrued. 
(2) Whenever any enforcement action is instituted by or on behalf of the United 
States with respect to any matter which is or could be the subject of a private right of action 
under this section, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of e\ery private right of 
action arising under this section and based in whole or in pan on such matter shall be 
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suspended during the pendency of the enforcement action so instituted and for one >ear 
thereafter: Provided. That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a 
cause of action arising under this section is suspended under this paragraph, any action to 
enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced either within the 
period of suspension or within the four-year period referred to in paragraph (1). 
[Codified to 12 U.S.C 1977] 
[Source: Section 106(g) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1768), effective December 31, 1970] 
(h) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as affecting in any manner the 
right of the United States or any other party to bring an action under any other law of the 
United States or of any State, including any right which may exist in addition to specific 
statutory authority, challenging the legality of any act or practice which ma\ be proscribed 
by this section. No regulation or order issued by the Board under this section shall in any 
manner constitute a defense to such action. 
[Codified to 12 U.S.C 1978] 
[Source: Section 106(h) of title I of the Act of December 31, 1970 (Pub. L No. 91-607; 84 
Stat. 1768), effective December 31, 1970] 
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